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INTRODUCTION
T he punishment of death is supposed to be reserved for those de-
fendants who commit the most grievous murders and deserve the
most extreme punishment. It is constitutionally insufficient to con-
clude that because a defendant is guilty of committing murder, death
is the only deserved punishment.' The judgment that a defendant is
one of the few who will be sentenced to death requires an inquiry that
looks beyond the defendant's guilt to consider whether the defendant
is worthy of a death sentence. This article argues that the distinction
between a defendant's guilt and deathworthiness is so often obscured
that defendants who are not worthy of the death penalty are fre-
quently sentenced to die in violation of the Eighth Amendment.2
Under the Eighth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court
has held that the punishment of death is not mandatory;3 the decision
1. See infra notes 3-10.
2. Many critiques of the death penalty system, and its constitutionality, exist. See,
e.g., Symposium, The Death Penalty: Race, Poverty and Justice, 35 Santa Clara L. Rev.
419 (1995); Challenging the Death Penalty: A Colloquium, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
Change 245 (1990-1991); Challenging the Death Penalty: A Colloquium Part 7,vo, 18
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 537 (1990-1991). This article addresses a fundamental
problem with the imposition of the death penalty that implicates its constitutionality
as well as its implementation as a matter of policy. While this article seeks to find
coherence in the jurisprudence of the death penalty, I am also aware of the numerous
voices declaring this an impossible task. See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141,
1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (concluding that "no
combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can save the death
penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies"); Robert Weisberg, Deregulating
Death, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 305, 395 (concluding that as early as 1982, the "Supreme
Court seem[ed] to have decided that it no longer want[ed] to use constitutional law to
foster legal formulas for regulating moral choice at the penalty trial"). Nonetheless,
given that the death penalty is currently a possible punishment in 38 states, as well as
in the federal system, it remains important to discern when that punishment is im-
properly imposed.
3. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding that a mandatory
death penalty does not comport with contemporary social values, does not avoid arbi-
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to impose the death penalty must reflect a judgment about the appro-
priate punishment for the individual defendant.4 Every death penalty
statutory scheme seeks to effectuate the requirement of individualized
sentencing through a bifurcated proceeding.5 At the guilt phase6 the
jury determines whether the defendant is guilty of committing a
murder7 for which the death penalty may be an appropriate punish-
trary jury decisions, and does not allow for individualized sentencing). This constitu-
tional principle is based on the premise that the commission of the same crime, even
first degree murder, does not necessarily deserve the same punishment. Roberts
(Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, Ste-
vens, JJ.) (noting that the move away from mandatory sentencing reflected the devel-
oping view that "individual culpability is not always measured by the category of the
crime committed") (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 402 (1972) (Burger,
Ci., dissenting)); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 75 (1987). But see Graham v. Col-
lins, 506 U.S. 461, 486-88 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting that mandatory
punishments are a "reasonable legislative response" to concerns about unguided dis-
cretion and discriminatory treatment of defendants); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,
671-72 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (contending that a mandatory death penalty is
not unconstitutional for crimes traditionally punished by death because it is neither
cruel nor unusual).
4. See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-05 ("A process that accords no significance
to relevant facets of the character and records of the individual offender or the cir-
cumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate
punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming
from the diverse frailties of humankind."); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
197 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) (holding that the Georgia stat-
ute was constitutional in part because it required jury to consider "the circumstances
of the crime and the criminal"); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,251-52 (1976) (same);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271-74 (1976) (same); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333 (holding
that the Constitution requires "focus on the circumstances of the particular offense
and the character and propensities of the offender").
5. All death penalty schemes provide for a bifurcated decisionmaking process.
Steven Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. Pa. L Rev. 1, 3 nA and app. at 1 (1980). In
Gregg, a plurality of the Court recognized that concerns regarding arbitrary and capri-
ious sentences, expressed in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), were "best
met" by bifurcated proceedings. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195. In a unitary system, guilt and
punishment were one decision. See, e.g., Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303, 312-
13 (1899) (notin, that a jury could return a verdict of guilty or guilty without capital
punishment). The drawbacks of a unitary system included the admission of evidence
related to sentencing but unrelated to, and possibly prejudicial to, guilt. Gregg, 428
U.S. at 190-95; see also Robert E. Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital
Cases, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1099, 1108-25 (1953); Weisberg, supra note 2, at 309-10. A
bifurcated system promised what a unitary system could not: At the guilt phase the
jury would hear evidence relevant to guilt; at the punishment phase the jury could
hear additional evidence, from both sides, relevant to its sentencing decision, but ap-
propriately excluded from the guilt phase. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190-92.
6. Throughout this article I will refer to this as the guilt phase. This does not
presuppose that every defendant will be found guilty, but, since this article focuses on
punishment, the first phase must have resulted in a finding of guilt.
7. The death penalty is a constitutional punishment for the crime of murder.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176-78. With rare exception, it is not contemplated outside of the
crime of murder. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality) (holding
that the death penalty was an unconstitutional punishment for raping an adult wo-
man); Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Capital Punishment 1995, at 3
tbL 1 (1996) [hereinafter "Bureau of Justice Statistics"]. But see State v. Wilson, 685
So. 2d 1063 (La. 1996) (finding the death penalty to be a constitutionally permitted
24 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66
ment.8 If so, at the punishment phase the jury9 must make an individ-
punishment for raping a child under twelve years old). Currently, all defendants on
death row have been convicted of murder. Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra at 1.
Though designated differently depending on the jurisdiction, the relevant crime of
murder is always the highest classification of homicide recognized in the state. See,
e.g, "murder," Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-1 (1996); "first degree murder," Pa. Const. Stat.
Ann. tit. 18, § 2502(a) (West 1983); "aggravated murder with specifications," Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2903.01 (aggravated murder) and 2929.04(A) (specifications re-
quired in indictment for death penalty to be a possible punishment) (Anderson 1995);
"capital murder," Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03 (West 1994); see also James R. Acker
& Charles S. Lanier, Capital Murder from Benefit of Clergy to Bifurcated Trials: Nar-
rowing the Class of Offenses Punishable by Death, 29 Crim. L. Bull. 291, 297-302
(1993) (describing murder statutes in death penalty jurisdictions). Throughout this
article I will refer to "murder" in order to designate that which the jury decides at the
guilt phase. The substantive difference between the designations given to the highest
form of homicide is whether a circumstance that aggravates the murder, thus making
the defendant "death-eligible," see infra note 8, is included in the statutory definition
of the crime or whether the presence of an aggravating factor is determined at the
punishment phase. This will affect whether the jury decides at the guilt or punishment
phase that the defendant is eligible to be sentenced to death.
8. This is the doctrine of "death eligibility" under which the class of murders for
which a defendant may be sentenced to death is circumscribed. Tuilaepa v. California,
512 U.S. 967, 971-72 (1994). For a death penalty statutory scheme to be constitu-
tional, the United States Supreme Court requires that it distinguish between those
eligible for death from those who are not by genuinely narrowing the class of murder-
ers. Id.; Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983) (stating that the Constitution re-
quires aggravating circumstances to "circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty"); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (holding that a capital
sentencing scheme must provide a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases
in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not") (alteration
in original) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concur-
ring)); see also Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363-65 (1988) (noting that the
facts of the murder alone "however shocking they might be" are not enough to war-
rant the death penalty absent a narrowing principle). The existence of a statutory
aggravating circumstance may be established at the guilt or punishment phase.
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-45 (1988).
Some defendants are not "eligible" for the death penalty because the punishment is
disproportionate to the crime, see Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (holding that the death pen-
alty is disproportionate for the crime of rape of an adult woman), because of the
defendant's age, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833-838 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
plurality) (stating that the death penalty is disproportionate for defendants under six-
teen), or because of the defendant's degree of culpability, Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (finding the death penalty disproportionate for an accomplice
who did not kill or intend to kill). See infra Part I.B.1. a. and c. The Supreme Court
rejected the argument that the death penalty is a per se disproportionate punishment
for mentally retarded defendants in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-40 (1989).
But see Jonathan L. Bing, Protecting the Mentally Retarded from Capital Punishment:
State Efforts Since Penry and Recommendations for the Future, 22 N.Y.U. Rev. L. &
Soc. Change 59 (1996) (describing and analyzing statutes post-Penry that exclude the
mentally retarded from eligibility for the death penalty).
9. The sentencing decision may be made by the judge or the jury. Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447,459 (1984) (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not require
sentencing by a jury); see also Gillers, supra note 5, at 13-14 (describing the various
types of state statutory schemes for who decides the appropriate sentence for the
defendant in a death penalty case); James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Matters of
Life or Death The Sentencing Provisions in Capital Punishment Statutes, 31 Crim. L.
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ualized determination about whether the defendant should be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment.10
Despite the constitutional command of individualized sentencing,
the bifurcated decisionmaking process does not ensure that the pun-
ishment determination is separate from the guilt decision. This fails to
occur because the conceptual differences between the determinations
made at the two phases are often elusive. Confusingly, both determi-
nations are described as judgments about the defendant's culpability.
At the guilt phase, the jury must decide whether the defendant pos-
sessed the mental state, or "culpability," required to commit the mur-
der.'1 Although jurors engage in a different inquiry at the punishment
phase, courts frequently refer to the judgment jurors must make as
whether the defendant's culpability warrants the imposition of the
death penalty.'2
Using the term "culpability" to describe the fulcrum on which the
two distinct inquiries turn is not only confusing, but more importantly,
it is inaccurate. The dual use of culpability is confusing because it
suggests that the two determinations refer to the same issue: the de-
fendant's culpability for the crime as decided at the guilt phase. This
results in courts,' 3 prosecutors,'4 and juries15 combining the guilt and
Bull. 19, 20-27 (1995) (analyzing the effect of the judge or the jury making the sen-
tencing decision). Throughout this article I will refer to the sentencer as the jury.
10. States implement these constitutional requirements through a variety of statu-
tory schemes. See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 464 (noting that no "one right way" exists to
design a death penalty statutory scheme). The Constitution requires only that the
death sentence not be imposed arbitrarily or capriciously. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-89.
This may be accomplished through any statutory scheme that narrows those eligible
for the death penalty and allows for individualized consideration of the appropriate
sentence. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971-75 (describing the two-step process of eligibility
and selection); see also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts:
Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109
Harv. L. Rev. 355 (1995) (offering an insightful analysis of constitutional channeling
and guiding requirements). The decisionmaking process usually follows one of three
models: most states require the jury to "balance" mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances; some states instruct the jury to "consider" the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances; and three states ask the jury to answer "special issue questions." Acker
& Lanier, supra note 9, at 27-52 (analyzing how different sentencing formulas affect
the sentencing decision).
Each jurisdiction also may decide which punishment options are statutorily author-
ized. death, life without the possibility of parole, or a term of years. See id. at 55-56.
In sixteen states life without the possibility of parole is the exclusive alternate sen-
tence to capital punishment; in twelve states the choice is between all three alterna-
tives; and in twelve states the options are death and a specified term of years. Id.
11. See infra note 62.
12. See infra note 65.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part II.
15. Se e.g., William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale Design, and
Preview of Early Findings, 70 Ind. L.J. 1043, 1089-90 (1995) (reporting that one third
of jurors surveyed in seven states thought, prior to the start of the punishment phase,
that the defendant should be sentenced to death); William S. Geimer & Jonathan
Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death
1997]
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punishment phase determinations into one decision-whether the de-
fendant is guilty of committing murder-instead of two decisions-
one about the defendant's guilt and the second about his16 deserved
punishment. The repeated use of the term culpability at the punish-
ment phase is inaccurate because the defendant's "culpability" for the
crime does not encompass the scope of the punishment-phase inquiry.
The punishment-phase determination is not a recapitulation of the
guilt-phase decision, but both a reconceptualization of the defendant's
guilt-phase culpability and the consideration of new factors relevant
only to punishment. Equating guilt and punishment defeats the pur-
pose of individualized sentencing in a bifurcated proceeding.
This article argues that the correct conceptualization of the punish-
ment-phase determination is one that asks about the defendant's
deathworthiness, not his culpability. 17 Deathworthiness is broad
enough to include all of the factors relevant to the sentencing deci-
sion: the defendant's culpability for the crime, as well as his character,
record, and background, and the circumstances and character of the
murder. Deathworthiness appropriately refocuses the inquiry from
whether the defendant is blameworthy-the question resolved at the
Penalty Cases, 15 Am. J. of Crim. Law 1, 41-47 (1987-88) (finding that 54% of jurors
interviewed thought the death penalty was mandatory or the expected punishment for
first degree murder); Maria Sandys, Cross-Overs-Capital Jurors Who Change Their
Minds about the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 Ind. L.J.
1183, 1191-95 (1995) (noting that the majority of jurors interviewed made guilt and
punishment decisions simultaneously); see also Craig Haney, Taking Capital Jurors
Seriously, 70 Ind. L.J. 1223, 1228 (1995) (observing that studies indicate that jury in-
structions often contribute to a narrow focus on the crime rather than the broader
non-crime related factors); Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and
Death Matters, 18 Law & Hum. Behav. 411, 420-22 (1994) (stating that in a study on
the comprehensibility of jury instructions, 45% of subjects focused exclusively on na-
ture and circumstances of the crime rather than the character and background of
defendant).
16. This article intentionally uses "he" to describe defendants. As of April 30,
1996, 98.40% of those on death row were men. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Death
Row, U.S.A. 949 (1996). Professor Elizabeth Rapaport explores the reasons for this
discrepancy in Some Questions about Gender and the Death Penalty, 20 Golden Gate
U. L. Rev. 501 (1990).
17. For a long time using the word "deathworthy" troubled me because it seemed
to presume that death was the proper response for the jury to make. But I now un-
derstand "deathworthiness" in a different way. In many respects, the process of de-
termining which murderers will be sentenced to death is based on the presumption of
life, not death, as the punishment. First, only certain murders may be punished by
death; all others are subject to a sentence of a term of years. Second, within the
limited set of murders, the class of defendants is narrowed to those deemed death-
eligible; all those who are not will be sentenced to a term of years. Finally, among
those who are eligible for death, the jury must decide whether the individual defend-
ant is worthy of death; if not he will be sentenced to a life sentence. Thus, determin-
ing that the defendant is among the most heinous of murderers should reflect an
assessment that he is worthy of death as an extraordinary punishment. The death
penalty is a punishment to be imposed in the rare case, at all other times, the pre-
sumed sentence is life imprisonment. I thank Professor Jeffrey J. Pokorak for contrib-
uting to this insight.
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guilt phase-to whether the defendant is worthy of being sentenced to
death-the judgment made at the punishment phase.' 8
This article explores the difference between assessing guilt and im-
posing punishment in death penalty cases by analyzing the concept of
culpability and examining the ramifications of failing to distinguish be-
tween the determinations a jury must make at each stage. Part I iden-
tifies the meaning of culpability as it is differently used at the two trial
phases. This part focuses on the United States Supreme Court's death
penalty jurisprudence to demonstrate the distinction between the two
inquiries. While the Supreme Court itself uses the same terminology,
the proper scope of the punishment phase includes aspects of the
crime and the defendant that are outside the scope of, and irrelevant
to, his culpability as decided at the guilt phase as well as factors re-
lated to the defendant's culpability for the crime as decided in that
first phase. Despite the ostensible recognition of the difference be-
tween a defendant's culpability for the crime and his deathworthiness,
courts frequently act as though a finding of guilt is indistinguishable
from a finding that the death penalty is the only appropriate
punishment.
Part II analyzes three situations in which courts, including the
Supreme Court, conflate the two inquiries. For example, courts fre-
quently employ the guilt-phase insanity test as the standard by which
to judge a defendant's punishment-phase mitigating evidence of
mental illness. Not only does this unconstitutionally restrict the jury's
consideration of mitigating evidence, 19 it effectively limits the jury's
consideration of the proper punishment to factors that are indicia of
guilt.
Part III considers why it is so difficult to separate the decision about
a defendant's culpability at the guilt phase from his deathworthiness
at the punishment phase, and offers suggestions for how to begin ad-
dressing this persistent problem. This part posits that society's moral
outrage at convicted murderers is a principal reason that courts, pros-
ecutors, and jurors collapse guilt and punishment. Nonetheless, the
constitutional imperative of individualized sentencing means that the
legal system must maintain the difference between guilt and punish-
ment. To properly effectuate the distinction requires a new lan-
guage-one focused on the defendant's deathworthiness rather than
his culpability-and a new approach to the jury's decisionmaking pro-
cess-one that includes instructions to the jury on the difference be-
tween its two determinations.
18. See infra notes 341-42 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
1997]
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I. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE GUILT AND PUNISHMENT
PHASES
The move from the guilt phase to the punishment phase may be
expressed superficially as a shift from "did he commit murder?" to
"should he die for committing murder?" A finding that the defendant
is guilty of murder establishes that he will be punished, but not that he
will be sentenced to death. The determinations are related but
distinct.
The differences between the determinations made at the two phases
are apparent in the evidence that the jury may consider at each stage.
Nonetheless, no coherent framework exists for distinguishing how the
evidence informs the defendant's culpability for the murder charged
from how it bears on his culpability for purposes of imposing death.2 °
This part first examines the evidentiary differences between the two
phases of a death penalty trial and then identifies and analyzes the
distinctions between the concepts of culpability used at each phase.
This analysis reveals both the relationship and the disjunction be-
tween finding a defendant guilty of murder and then determining
whether to sentence him to life imprisonment or death.
A. Evidentiary Differences Between the Guilt and Punishment
Phases
The types and scope of evidence the jury may consider at the guilt
and punishment phases, as well as the qualitative difference between
the two decisions, demonstrate that the punishment phase focuses on
a new, albeit related, question from the guilt phase. The distinctions
are also evident when one examines the aggravating and mitigating
factors that are considered constitutionally and statutorily relevant to
the sentencing decision.
At the guilt phase of a death penalty trial, the jury must decide
whether the defendant is guilty of the highest degree of murder recog-
nized in the jurisdiction. The defendant's guilt is determined by the
congruence of mental state, act, causation, 21 and absence of de-
20. Throughout this part, I use "culpability" to refer to the scope of the inquiry
about the defendant that the jury makes at each stage. As I argue in the Introduction
and in Part II, culpability does not accurately describe the focus of the jury's inquiry.
Rather, the punishment-phase inquiry should be cast as one about the defendant's
deathworthiness. Because the Supreme Court uses "culpability" to describe what is,
in fact, a different inquiry at the punishment phase, I use culpability for the sake of
consistency with the Supreme Court.
21. See Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law 78 (2d ed. 1995) ("[T]he
fully stated rule of criminal responsibility [is]: a person is not guilty of an offense
unless her conduct, which must include a voluntary act, and which must be accompa-
nied by a culpable state of mind (the mens rea of the offense), is the actual and proxi-
mate cause of the social harm, as proscribed by the offense." (footnotes omitted)); see
also Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 212 (2d ed. 1986) ("The
basic premise that for criminal liability some mens rea is required is expressed by the
[Vol. 66
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fenses.2 The jury may consider evidence relevant only to the defend-
ant's conduct and mental state at the time of the crime33 The
prosecution may not present testimony about the defendant's prior
criminal conduct unless it falls within a limited exception.2 Nor may
the prosecutor rely on evidence about the defendant's bad character
as an indicia of guilt.25 Similarly, the defendant may notpresent a
defense based on evidence of his general good character.' Neither
side may rely on hearsay, unless it falls within the normal set of
exceptions.27
In contrast, at the punishment phase, the jury may consider a
greater breadth of evidence than that allowed at the guilt phase.'
This evidence may include information about the defendant at the
time of the crime as well as prior to and after the crime, including his
future conduct that either side considers relevant to the sentencing
Latin maxim actus not facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not make one guilty
unless his mind is guilty).").
22. Dressier, supra note 21, at 181-97 (discussing defenses based on justification
and excuse); see generally Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic
Analysis, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 199 (1982) (classifying and analyzing defenses as failure
of proof defenses, offense modification defenses, justifications and excuses, and
nonexculpatory public policy defenses).
23. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (noting that the guilt phase is
limited to evidence "strictly relevant" to the particular offense charged); Dressier,
supra note 21, at 177.
24. E.g., Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (stating that other crimes may be admissible to
prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident"); John William Strong, et. aL, McCormick on Evidence, § 190
(4th ed. 1992) (explaining limited purposes for which prior criminal conduct may be
relevant, e.g., to establish circumstances of the crime, conspiracy, similarity to current
crime, motive).
25. McCormick, supra note 24, § 190; see, e.g., Nobles v. State, 843 S.W.2d 503,514
(Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc) (remarking that it is improper to try defendant for
being a criminal generally); see also George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 491
(1978) ("[G]uilt, culpability and blameworthiness... do not raise questions of the
actor's general moral worth or even of his moral wickedness in a particular situation.
They pinpoint the specific inquiry into whether it is fair to hold the actor accountable
for an act of legal wrongdoing.").
26. McCormick, supra note 24, § 191 (observing that character evidence may be
relevant circumstantial evidence: the defendant charged with murder may show he is
peaceable, but his honesty is not relevant).
27. Fed. R. Evid. 801-04; McCormick, supra note 24, §§ 245-53.
28. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 163 (1994) (noting that issues irrele-
vant at the guilt phase "step into the foreground and require consideration at the
sentencing phase"); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04 (1976) (opinion of Stew-
art, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (rejecting argument that statute allowed too wide a scope
of evidence at punishment phase); see Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (per
curiam) (holding that the hearsay rule must sometimes yield to ensure the constitu-
tional requirement of fairness and reliability at punishment phase); Acker & Lanier,
supra note 7, at 310-11; Robert Alan Kelly, Applicability of the Rules of Evidence to
the Capital Sentencing Proceeding: Theoretical and Practical Support for Open Ad-
missibility of Mitigating Information, 60 U.M.IKC. L Rev. 411, 435-59 (1992) (show-
ing that at the sentencing phase in a majority of states, rules of evidence are either not
applied or selectively applied).
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determination.2 9 In many jurisdictions, the State may present evi-
dence not only of prior convictions, but also prior unadjudicated of-
fenses.3 The defendant may present a wide range of evidence, for
example, his age,3' mental impairment,32 or good character and
deeds. 3 In states where the defendant may not present evidence of
intoxication or diminished capacity as a defense to the charge of mur-
der, he might be able to present it as relevant to the jury's punishment
decision.34 The jury considers this expanded evidence as it relates to
the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances which form
the basis of its sentencing decision.
Constitutionally, statutory aggravating circumstances are designed
to narrow those who are eligible to be sentenced to death by separat-
ing those murderers for whom death may be warranted from those for
whom it is not.35 Based on evidence about the crime or the defend-
29. Thilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 977 (1994) (recognizing that both back-
ward and forward looking criteria are appropriate); see infra Part I.B.
30. See Williams v. Lynaugh, 484 U.S. 935 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (arguing that the introduction of unadjudicated offenses makes
sentencing unreliable); Steven Paul Smith, Note, Unreliable and Prejudicial. The Use
of Extraneous Unadjudicated Offenses in the Penalty Phases of Capital Trials, 93
Colum. L. Rev. 1249, 1267-82 (1993) (examining the divergent approaches of the state
courts on the issue of unadjudicated offenses).
31. E.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (holding that age was a
constitutionally relevant mitigating factor).
32. E.g., id. at 116 (holding court must consider evidence of mental disabilities as
mitigating); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319-28 (1989) (holding jury must be able
to consider evidence of mental retardation, organic brain damage, and childhood
abuse).
33. E.g., Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 381-82 (1990) (examining how mitigat-
ing evidence of good character and deprived childhood are considered under Califor-
nia jury instructions); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986) (allowing
defendant to present evidence of his good conduct in jail).
34. E.g., Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.04 (West 1994) (permitting voluntary intoxica-
tion to be presented at the punishment phase as evidence of temporary insanity,
though it is not allowed as a defense to the crime); State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187, 196
n.5 (Idaho 1981) (acknowledging that intoxication is not a defense but may be a miti-
gating factor); Johnson v. State, 439 A.2d 542, 549-56 (Md. 1982) (holding that dimin-
ished capacity to form requisite intent is not a defense at the guilt phase but is
relevant as a mitigating circumstance); State v. Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d 523, 524-28 (Ohio
1982) (same).
35. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877-78 (1983). The Supreme Court has placed
few constitutional restrictions on aggravating circumstances. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 305-06 (1987) (noting that narrowing circumstances must be rational). Ag-
gravating circumstances must not be unconstitutionally vague. Maynard v. Cartwright,
486 U.S. 356, 361-64 (1988). But see Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653-55 (1990)
(holding that if the sentencer is the trial court, appellate court decisions, rather than
the statute itself, may limit the construction of aggravating circumstance). Certain
conduct, such as constitutionally protected speech, may not be characterized as aggra-
vating. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1992) (holding that the prosecu-
tion may not introduce evidence of defendant's abstract racist beliefs). Mitigating
evidence may not be turned into aggravating. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 885. It is not
constitutionally necessary, however, to designate evidence as aggravating or mitigat-
ing. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 981 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring). Some
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ant36 presented by the prosecution,37 the jury must find at least one
statutory aggravating circumstance in order for the death penalty to
be a possible punishment. 8 When the jury finds an aggravating cir-
cumstance it serves to separate that defendant from others who have
committed murder by identifying the crime as one of the most egre-
gious, the most heinous, or the most hateful.39
Mitigating circumstances are constitutionally defined as "any aspect
of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death."'  Mitigating evidence need not rise to the level of a de-
fense to the crime.4 Thus, even though evidence may not provide a
cast doubt on this conclusion, noting that evidence of the defendant's mental illness,
proffered as mitigating, may be especially prone to be viewed as aggravating unless
the jury is properly instructed on its role in their deliberations. See James S. Liebman
& Michael J. Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the "Boiler
Plate": Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 Geo. L.. 757, 786-89, 817-21
(1978); Ellen Fels Berkman, Note, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in
Capital Sentencing, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 291, 299-300 (1989).
36. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 973 ("Eligibility factors almost of necessity require an
answer to a question with a factual nexus to the crime or the defendant ....").
37. Although the Supreme Court has never required a particular standard of
proof, most states require the prosecution to prove the existence of the aggravating
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. Acker & Lanier, supra note 7, at 309-10.
38. This is what makes him death-eligible. Lowenflield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-
46 (1988). Some states list over fifteen statutory aggravating circumstances. See, e.g.,
Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a) (West 1988) (nineteen plus subparts); Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 565.032(2) (West Supp. 1997) (seventeen); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, § 9711(d) (West
Supp. 1997) (seventeen). Once a statutory aggravating factor makes the defendant
death-eligible, the jury may consider non-statutory aggravating circumstances in de-
ciding how to punish the defendant. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878-79 (1983).
39. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (holding that the facts
did not show a state of mind more depraved than others guilty of murder); Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987) (stating that it is necessary to distinguish the most
culpable and dangerous of murderers). Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976)
(recognizing that capital punishment represents "the community's belief that certain
crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate re-
sponse may be the penalty of death"). Many scholars question the extent to which
the enumeration of aggravating circumstances actually narrows the class of those eli-
gible for the death penalty when numerous circumstances exist that may aggravate a
first degree murder into a death eligible murder. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10,
at 373-74 (observing that the Court has approved aggravating factors that encompass
virtually every murder); Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death. The Ultimate Run-
on Sentence, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 29-32 (1995) (arguing that there is a need to
narrow rather than expand who we consider the most depraved killers); cf. Tuilaepa,
512 U.S. at 986 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (contending that sentencing factors may be
exploited to convince jurors anything is aggravating).
40. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (Burger, J. plurality)). But see infra note 344 (discussing how the
limits on the way the jury is instructed effectively limits what the jury may consider).
41. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-14. The Court rejected the lower court's limitation
on relevant mitigating evidence as that which provided a "legal excuse from criminal
responsibility." IL at 113. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had rejected
Eddings's evidence of emotional and mental disorders because he "knew the differ-
ence between right and wrong," and because the evidence of his family life was "use-
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legal excuse from criminal responsibility at the guilt phase,42 the same
evidence may serve to mitigate a defendant's punishment by explain-
ing his conduct in a way that shows he is not worthy of a death sen-
tence.43 For example, as an excuse defense, evidence regarding a
defendant's mental disability may be presented to show that he was
insane at the time of the crime.44 Even if rejected by the jury as a
defense to the crime of murder, the evidence may allow the jury to
understand the defendant or his conduct in a way that affects its pun-
ful in explaining his behavior, but it did not excuse the behavior." Id. (quoting
Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159, 1170 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980)). The Court held that
these limitations violated Lockett. Id.; see also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 78-79
(1987) (stating that whether death penalty is appropriate may depend on a "circum-
stance [that] existed at the time of the murder that may have lessened his responsibil-
ity for his acts even though it could not stand as a legal defense to the murder
charge"). Some statutory definitions of mitigating circumstances reflect the distinc-
tion between a defense at guilt or punishment by explicitly stating that the factor need
not rise to the level of a defense. See infra note 229.
42. Defenses based on a theory of excuse include insanity, intoxication, subnor-
mality (mental retardation), and immaturity. Robinson, supra note 22, at 221. They
seek to excuse a defendant by showing that he was not criminally responsible for his
conduct. Dressier, supra note 21, at 183 ("[A]n excuse centers upon the actor... and
tries to show that the actor is not morally culpable for his wrongful conduct."); Robin-
son, supra note 22, at 203 (remarking that an excused actor admits harm or evil but
claims absence of personal culpability). Excuse defenses posit that the defendant did
not, or could not, choose to engage in the blameworthy act and thus is not culpable.
See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, in Blame and Punishment 81, 85 (1987)
("The grounds for excuse are simply that this particular person could not have been
expected to act otherwise than as he did, given his own inadequate capacities for
making judgments and exercising choice.").
43. Welsh S. White, The Death Penalty in the Nineties 76 (1991) ("Defense coun-
sel must... explain where the defendant has come from and why he has become the
man he is now."); Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histo-
ries and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 Santa Clara L. Rev. 547, 560 (1995) ("[M]itigating
evidence . . . is not intended to excuse, justify, or diminish the significance of what
[defendant has] done but to help explain it .... "); Austin Sarat, Speaking of Death:
Narratives of Violence in Capital Trials, 27 Law & Soc'y Rev. 19, 41 (1993) (observing
that the penalty phase must explain but not excuse the defendant's actions); see also
Anthony V. Alfieri, Mitigation, Mercy, and Delay: The Moral Politics of Death Pen-
alty Abolitionists, 31 Harv.C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 325, 346-49 (1996) (noting the difficulty
and importance of distinguishing excuse from explanation).
44. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 21, at 183 (noting that the insanity defense ex-
cuses defendant because, "as result of his mental disease or defect, he lacks the moral
blameworthiness ordinarily attached to wrongdoers"); Robinson, supra note 22, at
221-23 (arguing that insanity is an internal disability that causes conditions that excuse
the defendant from criminal liability). Some scholars argue that insanity is not a de-
fense based on excuse but rather one based on status. See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 42,
at 99 (maintaining that insanity represents "such a breakdown of the normal, human
capacities of judgment and practical reason that the afflicted person cannot fairly be
held liable"); Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1091, 1137
(1985) ("It is not because crazy people are caused to do what they do that they are
excused; rather crazy people are excused because they are crazy .... The insane, like
young infants, lack one of the essential attributes of personhood-rationality."); Her-
bert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 135 (1968) (arguing that the in-
sanity defense is "concerned not with what the actor did or believed but with what
kind of person he is").
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ishment decision."s The purpose is not to free the defendant from
blame or punishment for the murder, but to alter the manifested form
the blame takes by sentencing him to life imprisonment instead of
death.
Most aggravating and mitigating circumstances directly relate to the
murder for which the jury convicted the defendant, for example,
whether:' the defendant committed the murder in the course of an-
other felony47 the murder was "heinous, atrocious, or cruel;"' S the
defendant was substantially impaired in his capacity to control his
conduct at the time he committed the murder;4 9 he was a minor par-
ticipant in the murder.5 0 Significantly, every state identifies factors
apart from the murder itself as relevant to the sentencing decision.51
Most notably, these factors include prior violent felony convictions~l
45. See supra note 43 & infra note 342. The broader reach of mitigating evidence
allows for the consideration of character that the excuse defenses do not. In this way
mitigation responds to the concerns of some scholars that if excuse defenses are ex-
panded to include explanations of character, no basis for criminal responsibility will
exist. E.g., Kadish, supra note 42, at 103 (rejecting evidence of social deprivation as
excusing a defendant when it only explains his conduct because "there would be no
basis for moral responsibility in any case where we knew enough about a person to
understand him").
46. See, e.g., Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 373 n.1 (1990) (listing California's
sentencing factors as contained in 1979 jury instructions); James R. Acker & C. S.
Lanier, "Parsing This Lexicon of Death": Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing
Statutes, 30 Crim. L. Bull. 107 (1994) [hereinafter Acker & Lanier, Parsing This Lexi-
con of Death] (categorizing aggravating factors by the character of defendant, the
manner of the crime, the defendant's motive, and the character of victim); James R
Acker & Charles S. Lanier, In Fairness and Mercy: Statutory Mitigating Factors in
Capital Punishment Laws, 30 Crim. L. Bull. 299 (1994) [hereinafter Acker & Lanier,
In Fairness and Mercy] (categorizing mitigating factors by defendant's responsibility
and culpability, future dangerousness, and general deserts).
47. Acker & Lanier, Parsing This Lexicon of Deadi, supra note 46, at 121 ("All
death penalty jurisdictions make the commission of a contemporaneous felony rele-
vant to whether a murder is punishable by death.").
48. Id at 124-30 (noting that the majority of jurisdictions use this or similar
language).
49. Acker & Lanier, In Fairness and Mercy, supra note 46, at 327-30; see infra Part
II.B.1.
50. Acker & Lanier, supra note 46, at 323-25.
51. See, eg., Acker & Lanier, Parsing This Lexicon of Death, supra note 46, at
111-21 (listing offender characteristics unrelated to the crime as aggravators); Acker
& Lanier, In Fairness and Mercy, supra note 46, at 303-41 (analyzing how mitigating
factors fulfill the standard established in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)).
52. Acker & Lanier, Parsing This Lexicon of Death, supra note 46, at 112-16 (doc-
umenting that twenty-nine of thirty-seven death penalty statutes include an aggravat-
ing circumstance related to the defendant's prior history of murder or violent or
assaultive felony convictions or violent criminal activity).
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or future dangerousness 53 as aggravating circumstances; and age54 or
lack of prior criminal conduct55 as mitigating circumstances. Thus, un-
like evidence at the first phase, some mitigating and aggravating cir-
cumstances concern facts apart from the murder.
The evidentiary differences between the guilt and punishment
phases are reflected in the qualitative character of the decision the
jury makes at each phase. 6 At the guilt phase the jury engages in a
fact-finding process: did the defendant commit the murder with the
requisite state of mind.57 While a conviction represents a finding of
blameworthiness, 58 that is not part of the jury's deliberative process at
the guilt phase. In contrast, at the punishment phase, the jury must do
more than find facts that are relevant to the defendant's punishment,5 9
it must consider the significance of those facts and make a judgment
about whether the death penalty is the appropriate punishment for
the defendant under the circumstances." The jury is required to
53. Id. at 118-21 (observing that six statutes include an aggravating circumstance
related to future dangerousness); see, e.g., infra note 107 (quoting the three factors of
the Texas death penalty scheme. Tex. Code. Crim. P. Ann. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon
1981 and Supp. 1989)).
54. Acker & Lanier, In Fairness and Mercy, supra note 46, at 330-33 (noting that
seventeen statutes identify age, while nine specifically list youth).
55. Il at 313-17 (noting that twenty-nine of thirty-one jurisdictions that identify
mitigating factors list absence of a significant criminal history).
56. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1007-08 (1983) (observing that the na-
ture of the guilt phase is fundamentally different from the nature of the penalty phase:
the central issue in conviction is establishing the necessary elements of crime proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, no such central issue exists at punishment where the jury
considers a "myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate
punishment").
57. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (stating that "the issue is
whether a defendant is guilty of having engaged in certain criminal conduct of which
he has been specifically accused").
58. See infra note 63.
59. Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1008.
60. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 481 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (contending that "capital punishment rests on not a
legal but an ethical judgment"); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 950 (1983) (acknowl-
edging that "moral, factual, and legal judgments... play a meaningful role in sentenc-
ing"); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 46 (1980) (stating that jurors exhibit a range of
judgment and discretion in making the sentencing decision); Williams, 337 U.S. at 247
(contrasting "narrow issue of guilt" to sentence based on "fullest information possi-
ble"). But see Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990) (holding that a statute
that requires the death penalty to be imposed if the jury finds one aggravator and no
mitigators was constitutional because the Eighth Amendment does not require thejury to consider whether the severity of an aggravator warrants the death penalty);
494 U.S. at 316-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the statute should be uncon-
stitutional because it does not allow for a moral judgment about the appropriateness
of the death penalty); Stephen P. Garvey, Politicizing Who Dies, 101 Yale L.J. 187,
199-201 (1991) (arguing that quasi-mandatory statutes, like Pennsylvania's, move
decisionmaking from the jury to the legislature).
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make a "reasoned moral response" to the defendant and the crime in
assessing how to punish him. 61
The evidentiary differences between the guilt and punishment
phases, in concert with the unique character of the two decisions,
demonstrate that the two phases of a death penalty trial serve sepa-
rate purposes. Despite these identifiable differences between the two
phases, the conceptual distinctions are elusive. The next part explores
the ways in which the guilt and punishment decisions are conceptually
separate, and yet intimately related, by examining the significance and
meaning of the defendant's culpability for the murder.
B. The Role of Culpability at the Guilt and Punishment Phases
The concept of culpability is used as a reference point to assess the
defendant's guilt and punishment even though, in the two contexts,
culpability denotes different aspects of the defendant and the murder.
At the guilt phase, culpability is most often used to refer to the state
of mind that the defendant must possess.6 Also at the guilt phase,
culpability may reflect a broader judgment about the defendant:
when he is culpable for his conduct, it means that he is blameworthy6 3
and deserves punishment.64 At the punishment phase, the concept of
61. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479
U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
62. The Model Penal Code classifies states of mind as "kinds of culpability."
Model Penal Code § 2.02 (1985). Murder requires that the act be committed "pur-
posely or knowingly," id. at § 210.2(1)(a) (1980), or "recklessly under circumstancesmanifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life," id. at § 210.2(1)(b).
Other state-of-mind designations for first degree or capital murder include "willful,
deliberate or premeditated." James A. Acker & C. S. Lanier, The Dimensions of Cap-
ital Murder, 29 Crim. L. Bull. 379, 383-88 (1993). One striking exception is felony
murder in eighteen jurisdictions felony murder is a capital crime even though it does
not require the intent to kill. Id. at 391. The fact that a person may be sentenced to
death absent a finding of intent to kill is especially troubling. See e.g., Daniel J.
Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 Ind. L.i. 375 (1994) (analyzing arbitrariness of
death penalty by using felony-murder as example of how imposition of capital punish-
ment relies not on state of mind of defendant but on state of mind of sentencer).
63. See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 42, at 77 (stating that mens rea "functions to dis-
tinguish the responsible from the irresponsible, the blameworthy from the blame-
less"); Sanford H. Kadish, Codifters of the Criminal Law, in Blame and Punishment
205, 238 (1987) (noting that the Model Penal Code is based on the principle that no
punishment can be made without blameworthy conduct); Edward M. Wise, The Con-
cept of Desert, 33 Wayne L. Rev. 1343,1352 (1987) ("Culpability connotes moral fault,
blameworthiness, guilt."); cf Peter Aranella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reas-
sessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 U.C.L.A. L Rev.
1511, 1521 (1992) ("To be morally culpable for his criminal conduct, the individual
must also qualify as a blameworthy moral agent.").
64. Dressler, supra note 21, at 3 ("[P]rinciples of criminal responsibility. .. seek to
identify the point at which it is fair to go from the factual premise, D caused or as-
sisted in causing X (a social harm) to occur, to the normative judgment, D should be
punished for having caused or assisted in causing X to occur."); H.L.A. Hart, Post-
script Responsibility and Retribution, in Punishment and Responsibility 210, 210
(1968) (positing that in order to punish, a person should have had, at the time of the
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culpability stands as the benchmark for when the death penalty is an
appropriate punishment.65 Using the same terminology to describe
the foci of the two phases conceals critical differences between the
determinations made at each. Without an explicit articulation of the
different meanings of culpability, the distinctions between the two de-
cisions in a bifurcated proceeding are lost.
This part explores the differences between the meaning of culpabil-
ity at the guilt and punishment phases by examining the Supreme
Court's death penalty jurisprudence. While many scholars suggest
that the Court has not presented a coherent theory of culpability at
the punishment phase, 66 it is apparent that the Court recognizes a dis-
crime, "a certain knowledge or intention, or possessed certain powers of understand-
ing and control"). That a person deserves punishment because he is culpable reflects
a retributive conception of punishment: "We are justified in punishing because and
only because offenders deserve it .... Moral culpability ('desert') is... both a suffi-
cient as well as a necessary condition of liability to punitive sanctions." Michael S.
Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in Responsibility, Character, and the Emo-
tions 179, 181-82 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (footnote omitted). Retribution
and deterrence are recognized as the principles that support the punishment of death.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-87 (1976). The focus of this article is on the death
penalty as retribution because that theory of punishment most directly implicates the
individual defendant's culpability and the reasons that will affect whether he will be
sentenced to death or to life imprisonment. See, e.g., Wise, supra note 63, at 1343
(stating that retribution refers to the punishment a defendant deserves, "to the extent
that he deserves it").
65. See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973 (1994) (stating that the deci-
sion whether to impose the death penalty must "assure an assessment of the defend-
ant's culpability"); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (holding that for the
jury to "assess meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness"
it may consider harm caused); Penry, 492 U.S. at 319 ("Underlying Lockett and Ed-
dings is the principle that punishment should be directly related to the personal culpa-
bility of the criminal defendant."); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822-23
(1988) (Stevens, J., plurality) (reasoning that persons under sixteen are not capable of
acting with the degree of culpability that justifies the ultimate punishment); Tson v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) ("The heart of the retribution rationale is that a
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal
offender."); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982) (noting that the appropriate-
ness of the death penalty "very much depends on the degree of [defendant's] culpabil-
ity"); Cf. Saffie v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 492-93 (1990) ("It is no doubt constitutionally
permissible, if not constitutionally required, for the State to insist that the individual-
ized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty [be] a moral inquiry into
the culpability of the defendant, and not an emotional response to the mitigating evi-
dence." (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting California v. Brown, 479
U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
66. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain from Heaven". Mercy in
Capital Sentencing, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 989, 1023 (1996) (observing that the Supreme
Court does not have a "well-defined theory of moral culpability" in its death penalty
jurisprudence); Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the Capital Sentencing Cases:
A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 323 (1992) (arguing that due
to tension between ensuring individualized sentencing and limiting arbitrariness, the
Court has not resolved whether a sentence should concern a defendant's culpability
or general deserts). The Court's lack of clarity has resulted in scholars positing differ-
ing theories about what the punishment inquiry is, or should be, about. Compare
Howe, supra, at 350-61 (contending that under the Eighth Amendment, sentencing
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tinction between the two inquiries. At times the Court seems to dif-
ferentiate between the two by casting the punishment-phase
determination as one about the defendant's moral culpability,67 as op-
posed to his purely legal culpability at the guilt phase. In this respect,
a defendant's moral culpability for murder may be greater or lesser,
depending on aggravating and mitigating circumstances, even though
his legal culpability remains the same. The infusion of moral factors
into the punishment-phase concept of culpability has a certain appeal
because it coincides with the kind of judgment the jury must make-a
"reasoned moral response."'  The guilt-phase determination may be
equally infused, however, with a judgment about the defendant's
moral culpability.69 The potential presence of a moral component to
the defendant's culpability at both phases suggests that classifying one
as "legal culpability" and the other as "moral culpability" is not a via-
ble way to differentiate the two determinations. Moreover, the con-
tinued use of culpability retains a focus on the guilt issue rather than
moving on to the distinct question of punishment.
This section posits a new way to understand the Court's jurispru-
dence on culpability in death penalty cases by examining how the
Court constructs the scope of the punishment-phase inquiry. This sec-
tion analyzes those factors the Court has identified as relevant to the
jury's punishment-phase determination: the defendant's mental state;
the circumstances of the offense, including the harm caused; the de-
should encompass the defendant's deserts as well as his culpability) with Carol S.
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization
Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 Yale LJ. 835, 846 (1992) (book review) (main-
taining that under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, the core Eighth Amendment
principle for individualized sentencing should be limited to defendant's reduced cul-
pability: "evidence that suggests any impairment of a defendant's capacity to control
his or her criminal behavior, or to appreciate its wrongfulness or likely conse-
quences"). As this article demonstrates, analysis of the Supreme Court death penaltyjurisprudence reveals that the sentencing decision must not be limited to a defend-
ant's guilt-phase culpability for the crime.
67. See, eg., Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (holding that a State may conclude that in
order for jury to "assess meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability and blame-
worthiness" it may know about the harm he caused); Penry, 492 U.S. at 323 (noting
that the jury could believe Penry's "retardation and background diminished [Penry's]
moral culpability and made imposition of the death penalty unwarranted"); Enmund,
458 U.S. at 801 (stating that punishment should be based on "personal responsibility
and moral guilt" of defendant). Scholars do the same. See eg., Wise, supra note 63, at
1352-53 (observing that culpability at punishment is "moral guilt").
68. Penry, 492 U.S. at 319 (quoting Brown, 479 U.S. at 545 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring)); see also South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 817 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (observing that the punishment-phase decision in a capital case is a pro-
foundly moral judgment reflecting the moral judgment of the community).
69. See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-36 (1968) (rejecting argument to
constitutionalize an insanity test because states must be free to decide grounds for
defendant's "moral accountability"). Scholars also speak of moral culpability as part
of the guilt-phase determination. Dressler, supra note 21, at 183 (suggesting that in-
sane defendants seek to avoid moral blameworthiness ordinarily attached to wrong-
doers); Aranella, supra note 63, at 1513-24; Moore, supra note 64, at 181-82.
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fendant's future dangerousness; and the defendant's character, record,
and background. This analysis reveals that despite the use of the same
terminology, the punishment-phase inquiry is not a recapitulation of
the guilt-phase finding of culpability.70 Rather, the punishment phase
requires the jury to reconceptualize the defendant's culpability as well
as consider new factors, none of which are relevant to the jury's guilt-
phase decision but all of which are relevant to the jury's determination
of whether the defendant is worthy of a death sentence.
1. Mental state
The concept of culpability at the punishment phase is closely related
to, but more expansive than, culpability at the guilt phase. If the de-
fendant committed the killing with the requisite mental state-degree
of culpability 71-he will be found guilty of murder. The question of
culpability at the punishment phase also includes assessing the defend-
ant's state of mind but in a more expansive way.72 As the Court ob-
served in Tison v. Arizona:73
A critical facet of the individualized determination of culpability re-
quired in capital cases is the mental state with which the defendant
commits the crime. Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the
idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more seri-
70. See White, supra note 43, at 75-76 (noting that the guilt phase requires the
determination of objective facts while the punishment phase requires the assessment
of objective facts and "something more"-a subjective judgment based on evaluating
aggravating and mitigating circumstances); Wise, supra note 63, at 1352-53 (observing
that in assessing punishment, culpability denotes "different levels of awareness and
organic capacity" and other factors ignored at the guilt phase, such as "underlying
motives, desires, attitudes, dispositions, impulses, pressures, and temptations"); see
also Gary Goodpaster, The Trial For Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299, 318 n.101 (1983) (noting that at the punishment
stage culpability refers to blameworthiness as well as "anything in defendant's life,
character, or formative influences [that] mitigates the offense").
71. See supra note 62. The defendant's state of mind is also referred to as mens
rea. Dressier, supra note 21, at 103 (explaining that the narrow view of mens rea is a
mental state that is designated by statute); Packer, supra note 44, at 104 (observing
that mens rea is "shorthand... for a cluster of concepts having to do with states of
mind or their absence, experienced by people whose conduct is arguably criminal").
Thus, both culpability and mens rea may refer to mental state. Packer, supra note 44,
at 76 (stating that the "orthodox" view of culpability is mens rea). Dressier contrasts
the statutory definition of mens rea with a broader notion of mens rea meaning "cul-
pability" or "moral blameworthiness" that is not dependent on the defendant's spe-
cific mental state. Dressier, supra note 21, at 102. He observes that this expansive
view of mens rea was refined over time and now, as a legal matter, has been replaced
by the mental state element. Id. The different meanings that the terms "mens rea"
and "culpability" sustain at the guilt phase may suggest part of the difficulty in pre-
serving the distinction between the assessment of guilt and the imposition of the ap-
propriate punishment in death penalty cases.
72. But see Givelber, supra note 62, at 377 (arguing that aggravated murder no
longer focuses on the defendant's state of mind but "'objective' external aggravating
facts").
73. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
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ous is the offense, and therefore, the more severely it ought to be
punished.
74
The punishment-phase determination of culpability is not resolved
solely by reference to the mental state required for murder, however.
Even though the defendant was convicted of possessing the "degree of
culpability" required for the highest form of homicide recognized in
the jurisdiction, the Supreme Court requires a closer, more finely
honed examination of the defendant's state of mind and criminal re-
sponsibility before a death sentence may be imposed. This expanded
scrutiny is most apparent from the cases that confer constitutional sig-
nificance on those aspects of a defendant's state of mind that exceed
the scope of the guilt-phase inquiry. In this sense, the Supreme Court
has set standards for examining the defendant's mental state beyond
that considered at the guilt phase in three ways: his capacity to make
choices and judgments, his depravity of mind, and, if he be an accom-
plice, his degree of participation in the murder. By its analysis, the
Court has demonstrated that even though a defendant was found to
be culpable as that term is used at the guilt phase, that finding does
not satisfy the punishment-phase inquiry.
a. Impaired Judgment
A defendant's mental capacity to reason, reflect, and make appro-
priate choices and judgments is considered in distinctly different ways
at the guilt and punishment phases. At the guilt phase, a mental im-
pairment will affect the defendant's culpability for the murder only if
he establishes such a high level of disability that it constitutes a mental
disease or defect such that he may be judged insane or, where recog-
nized, as possessing diminished capacity. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court has held that the death penalty is,7 6 or may be,77 an inappropri-
ate punishment for certain defendants because of their inability to
make mature and reflective choices and judgments. This determina-
tion relies not on the contention that the defendant lacks criminal re-
sponsibility but rather that he lacks what the Court refers to as the
74. Id at 156. The Court explained that focusing on the defendant's mental state
was appropriate because, historically, this was one of the earliest ways by which those
who deserved death were distinguished from those who did not. Id.; see Winston v.
United States, 172 U.S. 303, 310-12 (1899); William J. Bowers, Legal Homicide, 6-41
(1984) (analyzing the history of capital punishment in United States).
75. Robinson, supra note 22, at 206, 222.
76. E.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality)
(holding that the death penalty was a disproportionate sentence for defendants under
the age of sixteen).
77. E.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319-35 (1989) (holding that while the
death penalty was not a per se disproportionate penalty for mentally retarded defend-
ants, the jury must be able to consider evidence of mental retardation as mitigating);
see also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring)
("[D]eath penalty has little deterrent force against defendants who have reduced ca-
pacity for considered choice.").
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culpability required for the death penalty.7 8 The Court has applied
this concept to young age,79 mental retardation,80 and other mental
disabilities.8
Defendants under the age of sixteen may not be sentenced to death
because the punishment is unconstitutionally disproportionate to their
"degree of culpability." Underage defendants are considered less
culpable than adults for the commission of comparable crimes83 be-
cause they so lack the capacity to make rational judgments, to respond
reasonably rather than emotionally, or to appropriately control their
conduct, that the retributive and deterrent purposes underlying the
death penalty are not served.84 A fifteen-year-old may be responsible
78. In Penry the Court reasoned,
If the sentencer is to make an individualized assessment of the appropriate-
ness of the death penalty, "evidence about the defendant's background and
character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that
defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvan-
taged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpa-
ble than defendants who have no such excuse."
492 U.S. at 319 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982) (holding that
evidence of serious emotional problems in a young defendant "does not suggest an
absence of responsibility for the crime of murder," but it may have great mitigating
weight at sentencing).
79. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833-38. But see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380
(1989) (finding that the death penalty was not disproportionate for defendants sixteen
years or older).
80. Penry, 492 U.S. at 322-28.
81. Id at 308-09, 322-28 (explaining the relevance of mental retardation as well as
evidence that the defendant suffered from organic brain damage which may have re-
sulted from a history of childhood abuse); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116 (holding that
defendant's emotional disturbance and mental underdevelopment was relevant miti-
gating evidence).
82. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822-23. Justice O'Connor's concurrence provides an
important caveat to the plurality decision in Thompson. She concurred in the judg-
ment because the Oklahoma statute at issue did not specify a minimum age for impos-
ing the death penalty. Id. at 857. She reasoned that, in light of evidence that a
national consensus likely existed against executing persons under the age of sixteen, a
statute that failed to specify a minimum age was "of very dubious constitutionality."
Id This suggests that if a statute specifies an age under sixteen, a younger teenager
could be subject to the death penalty. See Christine M. Wiseman, Representing the
Condemned" A Critique of Capital Punishment, 79 Marq. L. Rev. 731, 753-54 (1996).
83. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835-38. Writing for a plurality, Justice Stevens opined:
The basis for this conclusion is too obvious to require extended explanation.
Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less
able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same
time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer
pressure than is an adult. The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the
privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible
conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.
Id at 835 (footnote omitted).
84. Id at 835-38. The Court also found other relevant factors to include "the teen-
ager's capacity for growth and society's fiduciary obligations to its children." Id. at
837. But see Thompson, 487 U.S. at 853 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing that
adolescents are generally less blameworthy than adults when they commit the same
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enough to be tried as an adult8s and convicted of murder,' but he is
not sufficiently "culpable" to be sentenced to death.'
Although this bar to a death sentence applies only to defendants
under sixteen,'m a defendant's age may serve as a mitigating factor for
those sixteen years or older.89 As the court recognized in Eddings v.
Oklahoma:
[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition
of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and psy-
chological damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial rec-
ognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are
less mature and responsible than adults. Particularly 'during the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment' expected of adults.9°
The Court found these concerns especially relevant to Eddings be-
cause, at the time of the murder,91 he was only sixteen, had a "turbu-
lent family history" that included physical beatings by his father, and
was emotionally and mentally underdeveloped.' The Court acknowl-
edged both that "the normal 16-year-old customarily lacks the matur-
ity of an adult" and that Eddings was not a "normal 16-year-old: he
had been deprived of the care, concern, and paternal attention that
children deserve."93 While Eddings's age and his mental and emo-
crime, but disagreeing that this means all fifteen-year-olds are incapable of the degree
of moral culpability necessary to be subject to the death penalty and that all fifteen-
year-olds are immune from the deterrent effect of the death penalty); id. at 859
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that "no plausible basis" exists for finding a national
consensus that no one under the age of sixteen possesses the maturity and responsibil-
ity needed to be punished by death).
85. Id at 819-20 (stating that the trial court certified Thompson to stand trial as an
adult).
86. 1&. at 819 (noting that Thompson made no claim that his punishment would be
excessive if committed by an adult).
87. Id. at 823 ("[llndicators of contemporary standards of decency confirm ourjudgment that such a young person is not capable of acting with the degree of culpa-
bility that can justify the ultimate penalty."); id. at 834 (reasoning that fifteen-year-
olds "deserve less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control
their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults" (quoting Eddings, 455
U.S. at 115 n.11)).
88. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
89. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115-16; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,608 (1978) (Burger,
J., plurality).
90. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115-16 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 635 (1979)); see also Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 518 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("Youth may be understood to mitigate by reducing a defendant's moral
culpability for the crime, for which emotional and cognitive immaturity and inexperi-
ence with life render him less responsible .. ").
91. Eddings pleaded nolo contendere to first degree murder for shooting and kill-
ing a police officer who pulled him over for recklessly driving his car. Eddings, 455
U.S. at 106.
92. I1& at 115-16; see also id. at 107-10 (describing the mitigating evidence
presented at trial).
93. Id. at 116.
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tional problems did not mean he lacked criminal responsibility for
killing the police officer, it meant the sentencer had to be allowed to
consider the evidence as mitigating Eddings's punishment.94
The Court also has recognized that the behavioral and psychologi-
cal effects of mental retardation may lessen a defendant's culpability
as that is considered at the punishment phase. 95 In Penry v. Lynaugh,
the Court held that the jury must be allowed to consider and give
effect to the mitigating qualities of a defendant's mental retardation.96
In an individual case, a defendant's mental retardation may mean he
was less able than a normal adult to control his behavior, to evaluate
the consequences of his conduct, or to learn from his mistakes. 7 Evi-
dence of mental retardation may not change the defendant's criminal
responsibility for murder, but it may signify that his culpability, refor-
mulated as a punishment issue, is not sufficient to warrant a sentence
of death.
The facts of Penry are instructive. Pamela Carpenter was "brutally
raped, beaten and stabbed with a pair of scissors in her home."98
Johnny Paul Penry confessed and was charged with capital murder.99
He raised the insanity defense'00 at trial and presented both psychiat-
ric and lay testimony in support. The psychiatrists testified that Penry
suffered from organic brain damage and moderate retardation that re-
sulted in poor impulse control and an inability to learn from his mis-
takes.' 0' Penry's mother and sister testified to his slowness in school
and frequent parental beatings as a child.'02 The prosecution experts
testified that Penry was sane but "was a person of extremely limited
mental ability."'0 3 The jury convicted Penry of capital murder.' °
94. 1&
95. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322-23 (1989).
96. ld. at 322-28. A plurality of the Court rejected the claim that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited the execution of a mentally retarded defendant because, as
Justice O'Connor reasoned, "I cannot conclude that all mentally retarded people...
inevitably lack the cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree of
culpability associated with the death penalty." Id. at 338.
97. Id. at 322-23; see also James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded
Criminal Defendants, 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 414, 427-32 (1985) (describing common
characteristics of mentally retarded defendants).
98. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 308. This defense required proof that Penry did not know his conduct
was wrong and was incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the
law. Id. at 333 (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.01(a) (West 1974 & Supp. 1989)).
101. Id. at 308.
102. Id at 309.
103. Id at 310.
104. Id. According to the Court, this meant "the jury rejected his insanity defense,
which reflected their conclusion that Penry knew that his conduct was wrong and was
capable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law." Id. at 333.
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This verdict indicated that the jury found Penry criminally responsi-
ble, possessed of the intent required to commit capital murder,'"S and
therefore worthy of blame. The fact that the jury did not find persua-
sive Penry's mental retardation and organic brain damage evidence at
the guilt phase did not mean that it was irrelevant at the punishment
phase, however. Quite the contrary; as the Court concluded, the evi-
dence was essential to the jury's determination whether to sentence
him to death or life imprisonment.106
The Court held that Penry's death sentence was unconstitutionally
imposed because the jury could not consider and give mitigating effect
to his evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse. At the
time of Penry's trial the Texas death penalty statutory scheme re-
quired the jury to answer three "special issues:"' 07 was the defend-
ant's conduct deliberate, was there a probability he would be
dangerous in the future, and, if warranted, did he act unreasonably in
response to provocation by the victim. The Court concluded that
none of these questions allowed the jury to give mitigating effect to
Penry's evidence. In answering the first special issue a juror could
conclude Penry acted deliberately in committing the crime and still
believe he was not sufficiently worthy of a death sentence. 08 The sec-
ond special issue allowed the jury to consider the evidence only as an
aggravating factor, suggesting that because he could not learn from his
mistakes, he necessarily would be dangerous0 9 The third special is-
sue, like the first, could result in the jury concluding that Penry's
mental retardation did not diminish the unreasonableness of his con-
105. In Texas, capital murder requires that a defendant "intentionally or knovingly
cause[ ] the death of an individual" while committing one of the enumerated felonies.
Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a) (West 1994) (incorporating § 19.02(a)(1)).
106. Penry, 492 U.S. at 327-28.
107. Id. at 310. The special issues were:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the
deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation
that the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit crimi-
nal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in kill-
ing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased.
Id- (quoting Tex. Code Crim. P. Ann. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1989)).
108. Id at 322-23. As the Court reasoned,
Because Penry was mentally retarded,... and thus less able than a normal
adult to control his impulses or to evaluate the consequences of his conduct,
and because of his history of childhood abuse, that same juror could also
conclude that Penry was less morally "culpable than defendants who have no
such excuse," but who acted "deliberately" as that term is commonly
understood.
Id at 322-23 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
109. Id at 323-24. In this respect Penry's evidence of mental retardation and child-
hood abuse acted as a "two-edged sword." Id at 324.
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duct, even though it made him less culpable than a normal adult." 0
Absent specific instructions telling the jury that it could consider
Penry's evidence as mitigating, the jury did not have a way to form a
"reasoned moral response" to that evidence in assessing a punish-
ment.' The jury could only find such evidence aggravating.
The Court's concern in Penry was that the jury have a vehicle for
assessing the mitigating nature of the evidence that reflected on the
defendant's personal culpability. Even though the jury based its pun-
ishment-phase decision on the same evidence it had heard at the guilt
phase in support of Penry's insanity defense, its consideration did not
replicate the prior inquiry. Instead, it was imperative that the jury
evaluate this evidence in a different and broader way as it informed
the punishment concept of culpability to determine if a death sentence
was warranted."12
A defendant's impaired judgment, whether due to age or mental
disabilities such as mental retardation or brain damage, excuses a de-
fendant from criminal responsibility in very limited circumstances.
Yet, as a punishment matter in a death penalty case, a defendant's
impaired mental capacity may wholly preclude a defendant's eligibil-
ity for the death sentence, or provide the basis for a jury to find that
the defendant does not deserve to be sentenced to death.
b. Depravity of Mind
A defendant's mental state may be reevaluated at the punishment
phase through the depravity-of-mind aggravating circumstance. This
factor focuses on the defendant's mental state, but goes beyond it by
evaluating the quality of his state of mind. What is relevant is "not
[the defendant's] mens rea but his attitude toward his conduct and his
110. Id. at 324-25.
111. Il at 328 (quoting Brown, 479 U.S. at 545). After Penry, the Texas legislature
adopted a new death penalty statute which makes personal culpability an explicit fac-
tor in the jury's deliberations. If the jury finds that the defendant will be dangerous in
the future, and if an accomplice possessed the requisite mental intent, the jury must
then answer the following question:
Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the circum-
stances of the offense, the defendant's character and background, and the
personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient mitigating
circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprison-
ment rather than a death sentence be imposed.
Tex. Code Crim. P. Ann. art. 37.071 sec. 2(e) (West 1991 & Supp. 1997). Mitigating
evidence is defined as "evidence that a juror might regard as reducing the defendant's
moral blameworthiness." Id at (f)(4).
112. Penry represents an articulation of "personal culpability" that encompasses
what this article argues should be considered "deathworthiness." The Court's analysis
of what it terms a defendant's "personal culpability" includes not only a reassessment
of evidence relevant to his guilt-phase mental state but also his character, back-




victim. 11 3 This "attitude" is articulated in different, and at times, dia-
metrically opposed ways. In Idaho, this aggravating factor, referred to
as "utter disregard for human life,""' 4 is evidenced when the defend-
ant is a "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer,""' 5 which the Court understood
to mean the absence of feeling.1 6 In Arizona, committing a crime in a
depraved manner means "relishes the murder""' 7 or "evidenc[es] a
sense of pleasure.""' 8 Both the Idaho and Arizona constructions of
depravity satisfy the constitutional mandate to narrow those eligible
for death.119 These holdings have been strongly criticized on the
ground that the terms do not distinguish among murderers in any in-
telligible way.'2 Nevertheless, they demonstrate that one way to dis-
tinguish between those who may be sentenced to death from those
who may not 1' is by looking to the quality of their state of mind, a
factor that goes beyond the guilt-phase mental state.
c. Accomplice State of Mind
A defendant may be found guilty of murder if he killed a person or
if he participated in a crime that resulted in the killing of a person. 22
When a defendant is an accomplice, and the killing is a foreseeable
consequence of the underlying crime,"2 it is immaterial to his guilt
whether he killed a person, attempted to kill a person, or even in-
tended or knew that a killing would take place. As an accomplice, the
113. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 473 (1993); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S.
764, 782 (1990) (noting that in Arizona the aggravating factor "heinous," "atrocious,"
or "depraved" manner requires the jury to assess the defendant's mental state and
attitude); State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1361-62 (Conn. 1994) (recognizing that a "hei-
nous or depraved" state of mind goes beyond that required for the commission of the
murder).
114. Arave, 507 U.S. at 465 (quoting Idaho Code § 19-2515(g)(6) (1987)).
115. Id at 468 (quoting State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187, 201 (Idaho 1981)).
116. Id. at 471-74.
117. Id. at 473 (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 655 (1990)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 470-78; Walton, 497 U.S. at 652-56.
120. Arave, 507 U.S. at 479 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority
opinion as "nonsense upon stilts") (quoting Jeremy Bentham, Anarchial Fallacies, in 2
Works of Jeremy Bentham 501 (1843)); Walton, 497 U.S. at 690-99 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Arizona's "heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating factor
does not sufficiently distinguish who may be sentenced to death from who may not).
121. Arave, 507 U.S. at 474-75; Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-33 (1980)
(reversing death sentence because the depravity aggravating circumstance did not dis-
tinguish those who should be sentenced to death from those who should not).
122. LaFave & Scott, supra note 21, at 625-26. See, eg., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137, 141-42 (1987) (noting that under felony-murder and accomplice liability statutes,
defendants who participated in robbery and kidnaping were legally responsible for
accomplice murders); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (deeming construc-
tive aider and abettor to be a principal in first degree murder).
123. LaFave & Scott, supra note 21, at 581, 590-91, 625-26.
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killer's state of mind is imputed to the defendant.' 24 In a death pen-
alty case, however, if the defendant was not the actual killer, his guilt-
phase culpability does not resolve the punishment-phase culpability
inquiry. Instead, the defendant's culpability must be refrained and
reconsidered.
In Enmund v. Florida,'" the Supreme Court held that the death
penalty is a disproportionate punishment for a defendant who did not
"kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal
force.., be employed."' 26 The trial record showed only that Enmund
sat in a car about 200 yards from the farmhouse where his co-defend-
ants shot and killed an elderly couple during a robbery.'27 This evi-
dence was enough to support a conviction for murder because
Enmund aided and abetted a felony during which a murder oc-
curred," but it was not enough to justify a death sentence. The
Court reasoned that the propriety of the death penalty must be judged
according to Enmund's "personal responsibility and moral guilt, '129
not that of his co-defendants. 30 The death penalty was an excessive
punishment in relation to his degree of participation because the evi-
dence did not show that he killed, attempted to kill, or intended to
kill. 131
Five years later, in Tison v. Arizona,12 the Court modified its En-
mund holding when presented with facts demonstrating a significantly
higher degree of participation by defendants who were accomplices to
124. See id. at 591, 625-26; Dressier, supra note 21, at 429 ("[O]nce a person is
deemed to be an accomplice of another, his identity as a person subject to criminal
punishment is subsumed in that of the primary party.").
125. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
126. Id at 797; see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (Burger, J., plural-
ity) (stating that the jury must be able to consider the defendant's minor role as the
getaway driver); id at 616 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that the jury should
have discretion to consider the degree of the defendant's participation in acts leading
to a homicide and the character of the defendant's mens rea).
127. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 786-88 (relying on the characterization of the record by
the Florida Supreme Court).
128. Id at 786.
129. Id at 801. The Court observed that the death penalty served no deterrent or
retributory purpose for someone like Enmund. Id. at 799-801. With respect to retri-
bution the Court stated:
[W]e think this very much depends on the degree of Enmund's culpability-
what Emnund's intentions, expectations, and actions were. American crimi-
nal law has long considered a defendant's intention-and therefore his
moral guilt-to be critical to the "degree of [his] criminal culpability," and
the court has found criminal penalties to be unconstitutionally excessive in
the absence of intentional wrongdoing.
Id at 800 (alteration in original) (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698
(1975)).
130. Id at 798.
131. Id. at 801.
132. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
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a murder.'33 In Tison, the defendants, two young brothers, assisted in
their father's and his cellmate's armed escape from prison.134 In the
ensuing flight, their car broke down and one of the brothers flagged
down a passing car.1 35 Both brothers participated in detaining and
robbing the family in the stopped car.1 6 When the two defendants
saw their father and his cellmate "brutally murder their four cap-
tives,"'1 37 they did not try to help the victims. 3 8 The defendants were
convicted of capital murder under Arizona's accomplice liability and
felony murder statutes.139
In accord with Enmund, the Supreme Court examined the defend-
ants' degree of culpability for the victims' deaths. The Court con-
cluded that even though the two defendants had not killed or intended
to kill, the death penalty was properly imposed because "major partic-
ipation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference
to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability
requirement."'1
The Court reasoned that "a narrow focus" on the intent to kill "is a
highly unsatisfactory means of definitively distinguishing the most cul-
pable and dangerous of murderers."' 4 According to the Court, while
some who intend to murder may not be criminally liable (because they
acted in self defense, for example), others who do not act intention-
ally, but with reckless indifference, such as the Tson brothers, may be
the most dangerous. 42 Thus, reckless indifference, even if not evinc-
ing an intent to kill, was a sufficient culpable mental state such that,
when coupled with major participation, could warrant death. Under
these circumstances, death was no longer a disproportionate punish-
ment for a defendant who did not actually kill."F1
The import of Enmund and Tison is that both necessitate a look
beyond the mental state needed for the conviction to know whether
133. According to the Court, the Tison brothers fell between the poles of a defend-
ant like Emnund and a defendant who actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended
to kill. Id. at 149-50.
134. M, at 139.
135. Id. at 139-40.
136. Id. at 140.
137. Id. at 141.
138. Id. But see id. at 165.67 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (contesting the majority's
depiction of the facts, in particular, whether the defendants tried to help the victims
or saw the shootings).
139. Id. at 141-42.
140. Id. at 158.
141. Id. at 157.
142. Id.
143. Tison has been extensively criticized. See, e.g., Kills on Top v. State, 928 P.2d
182, 201-04 (Mont. 1996) (rejecting Ton and applying Enmund as a matter of state
constitutional law and collecting and summarizing criticism of Tison by scholars and
courts: "reckless" indifference applies to all felony-murder accomplices; failure to de-




the defendant's culpability supports the possible imposition of the
death penalty. Under accomplice liability and felony murder statutes,
a defendant who does not kill the victim may be found guilty of mur-
der. Depending on the facts, that may or may not mean he is eligible
to be sentenced to death. The jury must consider factors related to,
but separate from, his guilt-phase culpability. These factors may in-
clude the defendant's own mental state and his degree of participation
in the murder.
2. Circumstances of the Crime
Just as the punishment phase encompasses a reconceptualization of
the defendant's mental state, the Court has held that it may include a
more expansive consideration of the harm the defendant caused.144
Under the Court's view, the particular evidence of harm may go be-
yond the facts of the murder in the form of "victim impact" evidence,
i.e., information about the character of the victim and the effect of the
victim's death on the victim's family.145 Generally, victim impact evi-
dence is not relevant to or admissible at the guilt phase in order to
establish the facts of the murder.146 In Payne v. Tennessee, however,
the Court held that evidence of the impact of the victim's death was
relevant to the jury's punishment-phase decision because it informed
the defendant's "moral culpability and blameworthiness."' 47 The
Court reasoned that assessing the harm caused by the defendant al-
ways has been important in determining the crime the defendant has
committed as well as the appropriate punishment. 48 In the death
penalty context, testimony about the effect of the death on the vic-
tim's family allows the prosecution the "full moral force of its evi-
dence" and provides the jury full information to decide the
defendant's punishment. 49 In the Court's analysis the prosecution
144. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
145. It at 817.
146. Id at 823 (noting that, in many cases, evidence about the victim may have
been introduced "at least in part" at guilt phase).
147. Id at 825. Payne reversed Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) and South
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) which excluded victim impact evidence be-
cause it bore no connection to the defendant's moral blameworthiness. Payne has
been the subject of intense criticism. See id at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Power,
not reason, is the new currency of this Court's decisionmaking."); Susan Bandes, Em-
pathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 361, 394-95 (1996)
(arguing that Payne was wrongly decided because the introduction of victim impact
statements deflects jury from its duty to consider the individual defendant's moral
culpability); Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering-A Personal Reflection and a Victim-
Centered Critique, 20 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 21, 65 (1992) (arguing that Payne "denigrates
victims while falsely promising help to their mourners").
148. Payne, 501 U.S. at 819; see Wise, supra note 63, at 1352 ("Since blame attaches
in part for results, culpability sometimes is used in a sense that includes harm. In that
sense, culpability is a function both of the harm and of the extent to which an offender
can be regarded as being at fault for having caused the harm." (footnote omitted)).
149. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
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could use victim impact evidence to present the victim as a unique
human being' 50 in order to "counteract"'151 the mitigating evidence
presented to humanize the defendant.' With this additional evi-
dence, the jury could consider the full extent of the harm caused by
the defendant's actions, not merely the bare facts of the murder juxta-
posed against the defendant's mitigating evidence. 53
Thus, just as the defendant's state of mind is reconceptualized at the
punishment phase, so too, the act of murder is reassessed to include its
subsequent effects.154 In both phases, the circumstances of the crime
may play a central role in the jury's determination of the defendant's
culpability, but the evidence at the punishment phase is more than
that allowed at the guilt phase. Likewise, the purpose for which the
new evidence is introduced differs as well. The new evidence serves
not to revisit the guilt-phase decision but to reconsider the defend-
ant's culpability for the crime in a new light as it informs the sentenc-
ing decision.
3. Future Dangerousness
Assessing whether a defendant may be dangerous in the future is
not relevant to the guilt-phase inquiry; yet it may be an important
factor at the punishment phase.'55 This distinction illuminates a cen-
tral difference between the two inquiries. The guilt phase is limited to
whether the defendant committed the crime with the requisite state of
mind; the punishment phase considers a reconceptualized view of the
defendant's culpability for the crime (as identified in the prior two
parts) but it also considers factors unrelated to guilt. When these dif-
ferences are properly understood, it is possible to see that factors re-
lated and unrelated to the crime are equally, but separately, germane
150. Id. at 823.
151. Id. at 825 (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting)).
152. 1& at 826 ("[TJhere is nothing unfair about allowing the jury to bear in mind
that harm [that the defendant's killing caused] at the same time as it considers the
mitigating evidence introduced by the defendant.").
153. Without this kind of evidence, the Court reasoned, the punishment phase was
unfairly weighted in favor of the defendant: The jury could hear unlimited mitigating
evidence about the defendant, but it could not hear about the impact of the defend-
ant's action on the victim's family or the community. Id. at 822.
154. The aggravating factor of "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" also invokes a reevalu-
ation of the circumstances of the murder. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356,
363-65 (1988). While the viciousness of the crime is not relevant to whether the de-
fendant committed the murder, it may be deemed relevant to whether the defendant
should face death because of it. See id.; Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29(1980) (holding that the aggravating factor "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
and inhuman" was unconstitutionally vague because every murder could be charac-
terized as such).
155. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 162 (1994); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262, 274-76 (1976) (holding that future dangerousness is a proper sentencing factor);
see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-906 (1983) (finding that expert testi-
mony on future dangerousness is appropriate at the sentencing phase).
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to the punishment-phase inquiry. When the distinction is not main-
tained, the broader focus of the punishment phase is lost. This oc-
curred in Johnson v. Texas,156 where the Supreme Court held that the
jury's assessment of a defendant's future dangerousness could encom-
pass an evaluation of his personal moral culpability.
Dorsie Johnson was nineteen when he killed a store clerk during a
robbery. 157 The jury convicted him of capital murder. 5 8 At the pun-
ishment phase the State presented several witnesses who testified to
Johnson's violent behavior. Their testimony recounted that he had
shot a store clerk during a separate robbery, causing her permanent
disfigurement and brain damage; fired shots at another man outside a
restaurant; threatened a girlfriend with an axe; and that he had been
convicted of burglary.159 Johnson's father testified in mitigation that
nineteen was a
foolish age... a kid eighteen or nineteen years old has an undevel-
oped mind, undeveloped sense of assembling not-I can't say what
is right or wrong, but the evaluation of it, how much, you know, that
might be-well, he just don't-he just don't evaluate what is
worth-what's worth and what's isn't like he should like a thirty or
thirty-five year old man would .... 160
The jury answered "yes" to the two Texas special issues regarding de-
liberateness and future dangerousness, 16 and the court sentenced
Johnson to death. 62
In the Supreme Court, Johnson argued that the Texas statutory
scheme was unconstitutional because the mitigating qualities of his
age could not be considered under the special issue of future danger-
ousness because that issue did not encompass his personal moral cul-
pability. Rather than focus on his culpability for committing the
crime, future dangerousness had only a forward-looking focus.' 63 The
Court rejected this argument, however, on grounds that "this forward-
looking inquiry is not independent of an assessment of personal culpa-
bility."'" The Court reasoned that the jury could assess future dan-
gerousness in light of how the defendant's age influenced his conduct:
"If any jurors believed that the transient qualities of petitioner's youth
156. 509 U.S. 350 (1993).
157. Id. at 353-54.
158. Id. at 354.
159. Id at 355-56.
160. Id. at 356.
161. See supra note 107.
162. Johnson, 509 U.S. at 358.




made him less culpable for the murder,"'" they could simply answer
"no" to the question regarding his future dangerousness."6
The problem with the Court's formulation is that it collapses the
qualities of youth present at the time of the murder into an assessment
of his conduct in the future. 167 Both may be relevant to the punish-
ment decision, but they are separate indicia of the deserved sentence.
The defendant's limited abilities, because of his youth, to act at the
time of the murder with the "experience, perspective, and judgment
expected of adults"'16 certainly could affect the jury's reconceptualiza-
tion of his mental state and thus his culpability for the crime. Sepa-
rately, the fact that Johnson could, as he grew older, leave behind the
immaturity associated with his youthfulness, might influence the jury's
assessment of his future dangerousness. By combining the two, the
Court diluted the importance of the defendant's responsibility for the
crime and forced the jury to consider his culpability only as it repre-
sented something that he might outgrow. This conflation created the
impression that the reassessment of culpability could be minimized or
assimilated into other factors rather than treated as a central and sep-
arate component of the jury's determination to impose death. 69 Fu-
ture dangerousness, rightly considered, should not incorporate the
defendant's culpability for the murder. Instead, it should be consid-
ered unrelated to the defendant's culpability for the crime yet equally
significant to whether he should be sentenced to death or life
imprisonment.
165. Id. at 370.
166. Id. "[I]l effects of youth that a defendant may experience are subject to
change and, as a result, are readily comprehended as ... mitigating ... one's future
dangerousness." Id. at 369. The Court concluded that because the jury could give
some mitigating weight to his age, no constitutional violation existed. I& at 372-73
(citing Saffie v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 490 (1990) (stating that the Constitution only
governs what the jury must be allowed to consider, not how a state structures that
consideration)).
167. As Justice O'Connor argued in dissent: "A violent and troubled young person
may or may not grow up to be a violent and troubled adult, but what happens in the
future is unrelated to the culpability of the defendant at the time he committed the
crime." Id- at 376 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor also observed that she
thought Eddings had made clear "that the vicissitudes of youth bear directly on the
young offender's culpability and responsibility for the crime." Id
168. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 635 (1979)).
169. The Court attempted to avoid this generalization about the relationship be-
tween culpability and future dangerousness by distinguishing the transient qualities of
youth that could be considered within future dangerousness from the permanent char-
acter of mental disabilities that could not. Permanent disabilities could be given only
aggravating effect with respect to future dangerousness because the negative effects of
the condition will not change. Johnson, 509 U.S. at 369. Transient qualities like youth,
however, may be given mitigating effect in some manner because they may change
and mean the person will not be dangerous in the future. Id.
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4. Character, Record, and Background
The Supreme Court consistently has recognized that the jury must
be allowed to consider the defendant's character, background, and
record.170 These factors may aggravate or mitigate the defendant's
guilt, thereby identifying him as highly blameworthy and deserving of
death or less blameworthy, and deserving to be spared the ultimate
sanction. They reflect on the appropriate sentence for the defendant
even though they do not implicate his mental-state culpability for the
murder.
Aggravating factors, as previously analyzed, serve the constitutional
function of narrowing the class of defendants for whom the death pen-
alty may be the appropriate punishment. 17 ' Although most aggravat-
ing circumstances relate directly to the circumstances of the crime,
and as such focus on the defendant's culpability for the crime,17 2 not
all of them do so.173 The aggravating factor of future dangerousness
may influence the sentencing decision 74 even though it is unrelated to
the crime. An aggravating circumstance concerning a defendant's
prior criminal conduct is also unrelated to the murder but is com-
monly identified as a way to distinguish death-eligible murderers from
all other murderers.175 When present, these aggravating circum-
stances may represent a basis on which to conclude that a defendant
belongs to that small group who should be considered death-eligible
or worthy of death. 176
Just as aggravating circumstances are not limited to the crime,
neither are mitigating factors. Certainly, aspects of the crime may be
170. See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 163 (1994) ("The defend-
ant's character, prior criminal history, mental capacity, background, and age are just a
few of the many factors, in addition to future dangerousness, that a jury may consider
in fixing the appropriate punishment."); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327-28
(1989) (stating that because the imposition of death penalty is related to culpability,
the jury must be able to consider defendant's character, background and record);
Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 78-82 (1987) (stating that the jury should also be
allowed to consider the defendant's age, background, and influence of drugs or alco-
hol when deciding whether to impose the death penalty); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110
(adopting the rule stated in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978), that a sentencer
may not be precluded from considering any aspect of a defendant's character or rec-
ord as mitigating evidence); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976)
(holding unconstitutional the North Carolina death penalty statute because it failed to
allow particularized consideration of all relevant aspects of the defendant's character
and record).
171. See supra note 35.
172. See supra note 46-48.
173. See supra note 51-52.
174. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 163.
175. See supra note 52. See, e.g., Shuman, 483 U.S. at 81 (noting that a defendant's
criminal record may be a valid aggravating factor).
176. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879, 887 (1983) (finding that the aggravating
circumstance of prior criminal conduct may help determine that the defendant is
death-eligible and affect the assessment of whether he will be sentenced to death).
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mitigating.177 But mitigating evidence is not limited to the crime or to
the defendant's culpability for the crime-it includes the defendant's
character, record, or background. 7 ' Character'79 may include posi-
tive traits such as "voluntary service, kindness to others, religious de-
votion,"'8 0 the fact that the defendant was a "fond and affectionate
uncle,"'' or the defendant's record of good behavior while in jail
awaiting trial."
Prior criminal conduct may also constitute mitigating character or
record evidence. In Sumner v. Shuman,1 s3 the Court held unconstitu-
tional a statute that mandated the death penalty for a defendant who
committed a murder while serving a life sentence because the statute
allowed for neither individualized consideration of the circumstances
of crime for which he received the life sentence nor for those circum-
stances related to the present murder."s The Court reasoned that evi-
dence about the defendant's degree of participation in the prior crime
might be relevant to the defendant's record or character.'85 In addi-
177. E.g., minor participation in the crime, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 597, 604
(1978) (Burger, J., plurality); Shuman, 483 U.S. at 79-80; or impaired judgment not
rising to the level of a defense, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). See Louis D. Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital
Punishment and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 283, 303-05, &
n.67 (1991).
178. Penry, 492 U.S. at 328; Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604;
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); see Bilionis, supra note 177, at
304-05 (observing that Lockett encompasses circumstances of the defendant's forma-
tive years, adjustment to prison, and positive traits such as "remorse, general good
character, hardworking nature, success in overcoming considerable hardships, service
to the community or the military, or relatively minor criminal record" (footnotes
omitted)).
179. The Court has not defined what constitutes "character." Franklin v. Lynaugh,
487 U.S. 164, 178 (1988).
180. Id at 186 (O'Connor, J. concurring); id. at 190 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that evidence of honorable military service, kindness to others, and church attend-
ance are related to the defendant's future conduct and personality). Justice Souter
characterized similar qualities as possessing "virtually no bearing on one's culpability
for crime in the way that immaturity or permanent damage due to events in childhood
may." Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 521 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
181. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397 (1987); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490
U.S. 805, 817-18 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("None of this evidence [that the
defendant was an affectionate and caring uncle] was directly relevant to the events of
September 13, 1986 [the day of the crime], but all of it was relevant to the jury's
assessment of respondent himself and his moral blameworthiness.").
182. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986). While unrelated "specifically to
the petitioner's culpability for the crime he committed," the jury may draw mitigating
inferences from such evidence regarding the defendant's character and future con-
duct. IL at 4-5; see also Franklin, 487 U.S. at 178-79 (noting that character evidence of
a clean disciplinary record in prison may be considered as a component of future
dangerousness).
183. 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
184. Id. at 78.
185. Id. at 81 (noting that prior convictions might serve as an aggravating factor,
but "the inferences to be drawn concerning an inmate's character and moral culpabil-
ity may vary depending on the nature of the past offense"). For example, the Court
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tion, the mandatory penalty did not allow for consideration of other
mitigating factors, 8 6 including the defendant's behavior during his in-
carceration. 18 7 Viewed as a whole, the statute was unconstitutional
because it did not permit the consideration of mitigating factors,
whether unrelated or related to the murder for which he was just con-
victed, which could provide the basis for a sentence less than death.',
Background evidence about the defendant may also serve to ex-
plain who he is in a way that mitigates his punishment. In Eddings v.
Oklahoma,89 the Court recognized that a young defendant's impaired
mental development and family background were as important as his
age in determining the appropriate sentence. 90 Similarly, in Penry v.
Lynaugh,19' Penry's personal background-his history of childhood
abuse-was as relevant to the jury's punishment-phase decision as
were his mental retardation and organic brain damage.19 In each
case the mitigating background evidence was not relevant to the
crime, but that same evidence was essential to the punishment
decision.
Evidence of character, record, or background may serve to aggra-
vate or mitigate the defendant's punishment. Unlike evidence regard-
ing the defendant's state of mind or the circumstances of the crime,
this evidence may not be related to the murder and thus does not
inform the reconceptualization of the defendant's culpability as a pun-
ishment issue. Nevertheless, this evidence is relevant to the jury's de-
termination that the defendant should be sentenced to death or life
imprisonment.
noted that Shuman previously had been convicted of murder, but was not the trigger-
man. Id at 81 n.9.
186. Id at 82 ("[Circumstances such as the youth of the offender, ... the influence
of drugs, alcohol, or extreme emotional disturbance, and even the existence of cir-
cumstances which the offender reasonably believed provided a moral justification for
his conduct.") (quoting Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 (1977)).
187. Ik (raising the question of whether the current crime was an "isolated" one, or
merely the "most recent" crime committed during incarceration).
188. See id.
189. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
190. Id. at 116.
191. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
192. Id. at 322-28. The Court concluded that it is "precisely because the punish-
ment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the defendant that the
jury must be allowed to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence relevant to a
defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the offense." Id. at 327-28.
While the Court spoke of these factors as related to the defendant's culpability, it is
apparent from its reference to character, record, and background that the Court
meant something other than the defendant's guilt-phase culpability, or even the
reconceptualized punishment notion of culpability. This illustrates the confusion en-
gendered by the use of "culpability" at the punishment phase and the need to recast





The decisions made at the guilt and punishment phases of a death
penalty case are distinct but related inquiries. The evidence the jury
may consider at each phase is different, as is the character of each
decision. Unfortunately, however, both decisions are framed as turn-
ing on the defendant's culpability. The foregoing analysis demon-
strates that the use of the same language obscures recognized critical
differences between the two processes. At the guilt phase, the assess-
ment of the defendant's culpability for the murder is limited to his
state of mind and conduct at the time of the crime. In contrast, when
the Court speaks of the defendant's "degree of culpability" as the key
question at the punishment phase, it means something both different
in kind and broader in scope than the defendant's culpability for the
crime as determined at the guilt phase. To ask whether the defendant
possessed the "degree of culpability" sufficient to impose a death sen-
tence invokes notions of guilt-phase culpability for the murder. The
answer, however, is not defined by the guilty verdict. Assessing the
appropriate punishment involves both reconceptualizing the defend-
ant's state of mind and the circumstances of the crime as well as con-
sidering aggravating and mitigating factors unrelated to the crime.
These may include the defendant's character, background, and record,
his prior criminal conduct, and his future dangerousness. 113 Each of
these factors is extraneous to the crime,194 yet relevant to whether the
defendant will be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. Accu-
rately understood, these factors inform the defendant's deathworthi-
ness, not his personal culpability.
Determining what punishment the defendant should receive re-
quires the jury to reconceptualize and reframe its focus from convic-
tion to sentence. By utilizing the guilt-phase language of culpability to
refer to the related but separate question of punishment, the Court
perpetuates confusion over the proper relationship of the guilt and
punishment decisions. Without a coherent framework structuring the
relationship between these two determinations, many courts, includ-
ing the Supreme Court itself, conflate the two decisions into one: that
one being the guilt-phase conclusion about the defendant's culpability
for the murder. Unless the distinction between the two determina-
tions is recognized and maintained, the purposes of a bifurcated trial
193. See e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973 (1994) ("Eligibility factors
almost of necessity require an answer to a question with a factual nexus to the crime
or the defendant .... The selection decision, on the other hand,... must be expan-
sive enough to accommodate relevant mitigating evidence so as to assure an assess-
ment of the defendant's culpability."); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 163
(1994); Penry, 492 U.S. at 327-28.
194. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) ("Evidence extraneous to the crime itself is deemed relevant and indeed, consti-
tutionally so .... [because] it was relevant to the jury's assessment of respondent
himself and his moral blameworthiness.").
197]
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and discretionary sentencing are dissipated,195 rendering the decision
to sentence the defendant to death both arbitrary and capricious.
II. THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN GUILT AND PUNISHMENT RUN
AMOK
While courts facially recognize that the punishment phase requires
a new inquiry that is not limited to the defendant's culpability for the
crime,196 the distinction between the two often becomes elusive. In a
variety of ways, courts minimize the difference between the two
phases by suggesting that the guilt-phase inquiry predetermines the
punishment inquiry. The result is that the two decisions essentially
are treated as one, the finding of guilt.
This part analyzes three situations in which the difference seems to
elude courts. The first situation is represented by a United States
Supreme Court decision that held constitutional a sentencing statute
that required the jury to consider, as part of a sentencing factor re-
garding circumstances that reduced the seriousness of the crime, a de-
fendant's mitigating evidence that was unrelated to the crime. The
second situation is typified by lower court decisions that inject guilt-
195. Arguably, after Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990), the constitu-
tional distinctions between the two phases may be minimized. The Pennsylvania stat-
ute upheld by the Court required the jury to impose the death penalty if it found one
aggravating circumstance at the punishment phase-there, that the defendant com-
mitted the first degree murder in the course of a robbery-and no mitigating circum-
stances. Under Blystone, the Constitution does not require that the jury separately
consider the appropriateness of the death penalty despite the absence of mitigating
circumstances. Id. at 306-07. Incredibly, in this situation, the jury is required to do no
more than is required in other states to decide that the defendant is guilty: find that
the first degree murder occurred under aggravating circumstances. This contradicts
the core principle of individualized sentencing, and, fortunately, is not followed in all
jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1027 (Utah 1989) (recognizing
that the punishment phase requires two steps: weighing the aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances and deciding whether the death penalty is the appropriate punish-
ment); Acker & Lanier, supra note 9, at 27-33 (contrasting "automatic" statutes like
Pennsylvania's with balancing statutes that require the jury to decide separately
whether or not to sentence the defendant to death).
196. See supra Part I; see also Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1044 (9th Cir.
1995) (noting that the death penalty decision weighs "the worth of the [defendant's]
life against his culpability"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1335 (1996); State v. Holloway,
527 N.E.2d 831, paragraph one of the syllabus (Ohio 1988) (holding that mitigating
circumstances are not necessarily related to culpability but to whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death); State v. Langley, 839 P.2d 692, 707-08 (Or. 1992) (en
banc) (holding that the trial court must instruct the jury that it may consider mitigat-
ing evidence not causally related to the crime); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 77 (Utah
1982) (stating that because some murderers are less culpable, the jury must consider
the circumstances of the crime as well as the defendant's background and personal
characteristics). Decisions that find certain errors harmless at guilt but harmful at
punishment also acknowledge the difference between the two phases. E.g., Hendricks,
70 F.3d at 1042-43 (finding ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase but
not at the guilt phase); State v. Thompson, 514 N.E.2d 407, 420-21 (Ohio 1987) (hold-
ing that the introduction of gruesome photographs was harmless at the guilt phase,
but prejudicial at the punishment phase).
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phase standards of criminal responsibility and insanity into the punish-
ment phase. The third is a line of cases from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that constructs a definition of "consti-
tutionally relevant mitigating evidence" that restricts such evidence to
that which has a nexus to the defendant's culpability for the murder.
Each of these situations demonstrates the power as well as the danger
of conflating the two decisions. The frequency with which they are
treated as coextensive reveals the persistent elusiveness of their
difference.
A. Collapsing the Seriousness of the Crime into the Punishment
The seriousness of murder is what makes the defendant eligible for
the most severe punishment. Still, the gravity of the offense does not
predetermine the punishment. While some may want to suggest that
every defendant convicted of the most serious crime should receive
the most serious punishment,197 such a practice would violate the con-
stitutional requirement of individualized sentencing. 198 Certainly
every defendant convicted of murder deserves punishment, but the
appropriate punishment is not always death. 199 The penalty of death
is not presumed to be the appropriate punishment even for this most
serious offense.
Espousing something of a contrary view, the Supreme Court, in
Boyde v. California,2°0 upheld the constitutionality of a sentencing fac-
tor that tied the jury's evaluation of mitigating evidence unrelated to
the crime to its view of the seriousness of the crime. By tying the
assessment of this mitigating evidence to the gravity of the offense, the
statutory scheme not only jeopardized the distinction between the two
inquiries, it jeopardized as well the constitutional imperative of discre-
tionary sentencing.
Richard Boyde argued that the California sentencing factors con-
tained in the jury instructions did not allow the jury to consider his
background and character evidence that was unrelated to the crime.2 °1
All of the factors specifically focused on the circumstances of the
197. See, e.g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 486-88 (1993) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (suggesting that a mandatory death penalty may be appropriate for certain
crimes); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 671-72 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(same); Wiseman supra note 82, at 741 n.38 (providing an example of a prosecutor
arguing that discriminatory enforcement of the death penalty would disappear if
every defendant convicted of intentional first degree homicide was executed); Note,
The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, 107
Harv. L. Rev. 1923, 1931 (1994) (suggesting that the nature of the murder combined
with "overwhelming evidence of guilt," is one reason courts reviewing ineffective
assistance of counsel claims "are often unable to imagine that a jury would have im-
posed any sentence but death").
198. See supra note 4.
199. See supra notes 3-10 and accompanying text.
200. 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
201. Id at 378, 381.
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crime 02 or on the defendant's criminal history," 3 except for a final
factor [hereinafter "factor (k)"] that allowed the jury to consider:
"[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime
even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. '" ° The trial court
defined "extenuate" as "to lessen the seriousness of the crime as by
giving an excuse. '2 °5 Boyde argued that factor (k) did not permit the
jury to consider his character and background evidence because the
language "extenuates the gravity of the crime" limited relevant cir-
cumstances to those related only to the crime.2 0 6 His were not. He
presented testimony from psychologists, family, and friends about his
deprived background, borderline intelligence, and positive character
traits.° 7
The Court rejected Boyde's argument on the ground that "no rea-
sonable likelihood" existed that a juror would apply factor (k) in a
way that prevented her from considering this evidence;208 a juror
would understand that she could consider a defendant's mitigating ev-
idence of character and background that was unrelated to the crime
within this factor. The Court cited the language used in Penry v.
Lynaugh2 0 9 to support its conclusion: evidence of background and
character is relevant because it may show the defendant is "less culpa-
ble than defendants who have no such excuse. '2 1 ° In this context, the
Court reasoned that Boyde could argue that "his background and
character 'extenuated' or 'excused' the seriousness of [his] crime. "211
According to the Court, factor (k) did not limit extenuation to "any
other circumstance of the crime," but allowed the jury to consider
"any other circumstance" which certainly included background and
character. 1
202. Id at 373 n.1 (listing the relevant factors as: the circumstances of the crime;
whether the crime was committed while the defendant was extremely emotionally or
mentally disturbed; whether the victim was a participant in the homicidal conduct;
whether the defendant believed he was morally justified; or was under extreme du-
ress; or was able to appreciate the criminality of or conform his conduct to, the re-
quirements of the law; the defendant's age; and whether the defendant was an
accomplice).
203. Id (listing the relevant factors as: the presence or absence of criminal activity
involving the use or attempted use of force or violence; the presence or absence of
prior felony convictions).
204. Id at 373-74. This was a "catch-all" factor.
205. Id at 381.
206. Id at 378-79.
207. Id at 382, 388 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
208. Id at 381.
209. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
210. Boyde, 494 U.S. at 382. Quoted in full at supra note 78.
211. Id at 382.
212. Id The court also reasoned that even if factor (k) was unclear, the fact that
other factors refer to non-crime related evidence (e.g., age, the presence or absence of
prior criminal activity or prior felony convictions) made it "improbable" that the jury
would conclude it could not consider evidence that took four days to present, espe-
cially when the trial court instructed the jury to consider "all of the evidence." Id. at
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Arguably, Boyde upheld the importance of mitigating evidence un-
related to the crime, and in so doing, affirmed the distinction between
the two phases. The Court's analysis failed, however, to recognize
that factor (k), by its very language, inexorably retained its focus on
the crime itself, and specifically on the crime's gravity. To require the
jury to consider background and character evidence in this context
was wrong for two reasons. First, factor (k) did not allow the jury to
consider the mitigating quality of Boyde's character and background
evidence separate from the crime.213 Second, factor (k) essentially re-
quired the jury to change its mind about the seriousness of the murder
in order to give effect to the mitigating evidence. At the guilt phase,
the jury convicted Boyde of the most serious crime, finding him guilty
of the only crime eligible for death. Under the Court's holding, the
only way the jury could consider Boyde's background or character ev-
idence unrelated to the crime was, in essence, to denigrate the value
of its own guilty verdict. If the jury wanted to consider "any other
circumstance" 214 not previously covered by the other factors, it could
do so only if it found the evidence "extenuate[d] the gravity of the
crime. '112 5 In other words, the jury could effectively consider evidence
unrelated to the murder only if the evidence made the murder less
serious.
The burden on the defendant and the jury to place character and
background evidence unrelated to the crime in the limited context of
extenuating the crime itself is an unfair, if not impossible, task. It
should not be constitutionally acceptable. The question at the punish-
ment phase is not whether the murder was less serious. Rather, the
essential inquiry is whether the defendant is less deserving of a death
sentence because of his character or background, in spite of, or even in
the face of, the seriousness of the murder.216 As Justice Marshall ar-
gued in dissent, a defendant may be less culpable for the crime with-
out the crime being less serious.217 The seriousness of the murder
cannot be undone; the death penalty is within the realm of possibility
383 (emphasis omitted). But see ida at 398 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Under any stan-
dard... the instructions are inadequate to ensure that the jury considered all mitigat-
ing evidence.").
213. See id. at 398-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("A 'circumstance which extenuates
the gravity of the crime' unambiguously refers to the circumstances related to the
crime. Jurors, relying on ordinary language and experience, would not view the seri-
ousness of a crime as dependent upon the background or character of the offender.").
This is in keeping with one of the basic distinctions between the two phases: Guilt
may not be based on background or character, punishment may. Id. at 399 n.5.
214. Id at 381.
215. Id
216. id at 399 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[A]n offender's background and charac-
ter unrelated to his crime should be considered by the sentencer because of society's
deeply felt view that punishment should reflect both the seriousness of a crime and
the nature of the offender.").
217. IdL at 400.
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only because the crime is so serious. If the applicability of the death
penalty hung on the seriousness of the crime alone, the role of the jury
at sentencing would be greatly circumscribed. One of the few consti-
tutional requirements of a statutory death penalty scheme, however, is
that the scheme allow for the individualized consideration of the de-
fendant: his character and background in addition to the circum-
stances of the crime. In light of this imperative, it is untenable to
require the jury to find the crime less serious if it wants to accord
mitigating weight to evidence unrelated to the crime. The jury must
be allowed to respect the gravity of the crime and still find the defend-
ant undeserving of death.
B. Injecting Guilt-Phase Concepts into the Punishment Phase
The tension between the seriousness of the crime of murder and
whether the defendant should be sentenced to death for committing
the crime also appears in cases where guilt-phase concepts of criminal
responsibility are injected into the punishment-phase inquiry. What
results is loss of the significance of the punishment-phase evidence-
the punishment decision becomes a recapitulation of guilt rather than
a reconceptualization of the defendant and the crime. This section
examines two situations in which this phenomenon occurs: cases that
inject the insanity test into the punishment phase to evaluate mitigat-
ing evidence of mental disabilities, and cases that conceptualize miti-
gating evidence as negating criminal responsibility.
1. Insanity Defense as a Mitigating Factor
The difference between the guilt-phase and punishment-phase in-
quiries is conflated by courts that inject the insanity test into the eval-
uation of a defendant's mental disability at punishment. Prosecutors
exacerbate this error by arguing to juries that the consideration of the
defendant's mental disability is effectively the same at each of the two
phases.218 Courts that fail to recognize the difference between in-
218. E.g., Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1293 (8th Cir. 1994) (discussing a trial in
which, at the punishment phase, the prosecutor argued that the defendant's mild re-
tardation did not prevent him from knowing right from wrong); Deutscher v. Whitley,
884 F.2d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (offering an example of a prosecutor arguing, at
the punishment phase, "Don't you believe if he had a doctor that would say he was
insane, which he is entitled to, that you would have had him on the stand here?");
Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d 552, 569 (Del. 1985) (holding that the prosecutor erred in
arguing mitigating factors insufficient to "mitigate and excuse"); State v. English, 367
So. 2d 815, 819 (La. 1979) (reversing, in part, because prosecutor relied heavily on
testimony about insanity and the guilt-phase decision in his closing argument at pun-
ishment); State v. Lawrence, 541 N.E.2d 451, 456 n.5 (Ohio 1989) (reversing, in part,
because the prosecutor argued that considering defendant's mental state at punish-
ment was "the deja vu" of considering his insanity defense); State v. Brett, 892 P.2d
29, 61 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (offering an instance where the prosecutor argued that
the defendant knew right from wrong when the proper standard was substantial im-
pairment), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 931 (1996).
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sanity as a defense and mental disability as a mitigating factor com-
pound the error of collapsing the two phases into one. 19
The insanity defense seeks to excuse the defendant from criminal
responsibility by negating his culpability for the murdern 2 °0 A defend-
ant may present evidence demonstrating' that he should not be
found guilty because he suffered from a mental disease or defect.2m
Depending on the jurisdiction, this mental disease or defect may im-
pair his ability to know right from wrong or to know the nature or
quality of his acts;213 to appreciate the criminality of his conduct;.24 or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. 5 This is an
intentionally exacting standard.2-6 If the defendant is found insane, it
means that he is not criminally responsible for his conduct and will not
be punished? 7
219. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. This is further exacerbated by the
possibility that mental disabilities may be turned into an aggravating factor. See Berk-
man, supra note 35, at 299-300, 305-08 (arguing that the sentencer should not be al-
lowed to consider as aggravating factors any circumstances caused by the defendant's
mental illness).
220. See infra notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
221. Jurisdictions vary in the burden of proof placed on the defendant to establish
his insanity; in the federal system the burden is clear and convincing, but most states
require proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Dressier, supra note 21, at 314.
222. This phrase is usually not defined. Id at 317-18 (discussing medical and legal
definitions of "mental disease or defect"). The ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health
Standards propose the following definition: "(i) impairments of mind, whether endur-
ing or transitory; or, (ii) mental retardation, either of which substantially affected the
mental or emotional processes of the defendant at the time of the alleged offense."
ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, Standard 7-6.1(b) (1989); id., Com-
mentary at 345 (contrasting "broad" medical definition of "mental disorder" with
types of psychopathy or disabilities that are required as thresholds for "mental
nonresponsibility").
223. This is the classic M'Naghten test: "[T]o establish a defense on the ground of
insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party
accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not
to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong." M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843)
quoted in LaFave & Scott, supra note 21, at 311. This is the most common test for
insanity. LaFave & Scott, supra note 21, at 312 (discussing the traditional tests for the
insanity defense); see generally id. at 310-23; Dressier, supra note 21, at 319-22 (dis-
cussing the different legal formulations of the insanity defense).
224. "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such con-
duct as a result of a mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law." Model Penal Code § 4.01(1) (1985) (alteration in original).
225. Id. This impairment is increasingly excluded as part of the insanity test. See,
e.g., infra note 258. When the inability to control one's conduct is not part of the
insanity test, it may form the basis of the verdict "guilty but mentally ilL" See, e.g.,
Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117, 124 (DeL 1990).
226. The insanity defense is rarely interposed, and even more rarely successful See
ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, supra note 222, at 323 (noting that
the insanity defense is raised in less than one percent of felony cases, successful in less
than one quarter).
227. Defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity are almost always commit-
ted to a mental institution. Dressier, supra note 21, at 324-25. This may result in a
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A defendant's mental disease or defect may also be relevant as a
mitigating factor at the punishment phase, regardless of whether it
was presented as a defense at the guilt phase. As a basis for a sen-
tence less than death, a defendant's disability may not need to consti-
tute the same mental disease or defect required to invoke the insanity
test,"2 8 or the disability may not need to result in the same high degree
of impaired capacity.22 9 These distinctions arise from the recognition
that "[s]ome lesser impairment or incapacity may suffice to suggest
that the death penalty should not be invoked." 30 A jury may find the
defendant criminally responsible for murder but nevertheless too im-
paired to deserve a death sentence.
Whether courts, and ultimately juries, understand how the tests
governing mental disabilities at the two phases are different, is ques-
tionable. Cases are replete with examples of prosecutors and trial
courts who treat the standard by which the jury should judge the sig-
nificance of the defendant's mental disability at the punishment phase
as the same as the guilt-phase test.3 Often, appellate courts attempt
longer term of confinement than if he had been convicted, id., but it still precludes
other forms of punishment, like the death penalty; cf Sanders, 585 A.2d at 144-49
(stating that the death penalty may be imposed on a defendant found guilty but men-
tally ill).
228. Indeed, according to Acker & Lanier, "most jurisdictions simply focus on the
fact of an offender's impairment and have refrained from requiring that a mental
disease or defect, intoxication, or other cause be identified for the impairment."
Acker & Lanier, In Fairness and Mercy, supra note 46, at 328 (citing New Mexico as
an example: "[T]he defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness]
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired.").
229. Compare Model Penal Code § 210.6(4)(g) (stating that as a mitigating circum-
stance, the mental disease or defect need only result in an impaired capacity) with
§ 4.01(1) (noting that insanity requires the defendant to lack substantial capacity);
Louisiana, infra notes 238 & 239; Ohio, infra notes 256 & 257. Some jurisdictions
specifically differentiate the two standards by adding a provision to the relevant miti-
gating factors stating "[tihe defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly im-
paired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution." Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 13-703(G)(1) (West 1989 & Supp. 1996 (emphasis added)); see also Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 16-11-103(4)(b) (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-
46a(h)(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.025(2)(b)(7) (Michie
1990 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 400.27(9)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1997);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-2040)(8) (West 1991 & Supp. 1996).
230. Model Penal Code § 210.6 cmt. at 138.
231. See supra note 218; see also Morgan v. State, 639 So. 2d 6, 13 (Fla. 1994) (find-
ing that the trial court erroneously rejected mitigating circumstances of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance because it thought it was bound by the jury's rejec-
tion of the insanity defense); Brown v. State, 577 N.E.2d 221, 234 (Ind. 1991) (holding
that the trial court did not err in finding that the defendant did not suffer from "ex-
treme mental or emotional disturbance" even though this conclusion was based on
the trial court's assessment that the defendant's impairment was not extreme enough
to excuse his conduct because the trial court also relied on the correct punishment-
phase standard when it found that the defendant possessed "substantial capacity to
appreciate the criminality of her conduct" and control her conduct); Hunter v. Com-
monwealth, 869 S.W.2d 719, 726 (Ky. 1994) (holding that while the evidence did not
warrant a guilt-phase instruction on extreme emotional or mental distress, the trial
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to correct the error and place mitigating evidence of mental disability
in its proper context at the punishment phase. 2  At other times, ap-
pellate courts perpetuate these errors made at the trial level.?33 Some-
court erred in not giving such an instruction at the punishment phase where the stan-
dard was lower); State v. Holloway, 527 N.E.2d 831, 839 (Ohio 1988) (finding that
testimony about the defendant knowing right from wrong diminished the significance
of a mitigating factor regarding substantial impairment); Berard v. State, 402 So. 2d
1044, 1049-51 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981) (affirming the trial court that characterized the
defendant's mitigating evidence of emotional instability as not excusing or justifying
criminal conduct and as showing he appreciated the consequences of his conduct);
Lewis v. State, 380 So. 2d 970, 976-8 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (holding that the trial
court did not sufficiently take into account the defendant's subnormal mental capacity
as a mitigating factor, not equal to insanity); cf. Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032,
1043-45 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming grant of writ of habeas corpus and rejecting the
State's argument that trial counsel was reasonable to limit his punishment-phase in-
vestigation of mitigating evidence based on the mental health evaluation conducted
for the guilt phase); Claboume v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1384-87 (9th Cir. 1995) (af-
firming grant of writ of habeas corpus based on counsel's ineffectiveness at sentencing
for limiting the relevance of mitigating evidence to insanity rather than significant
impairment); Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1290-93 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the
trial attorney's failure to provide an expert on mental defect as a mitigating issue,
separate from guilt-phase defense, was not harmless error); Kenley v. Armontrout,
937 F.2d 1298, 1307-09 (8th Cir. 1991) (reversing and remanding to the district court
with instructions to grant the writ of habeas corpus based on ineffective assistance of
counsel at sentencing phase because counsel was not justified in relying on an expert's
report ruling out mental disease or defect but not considering lesser mental disorders
as mitigating factors). Jurors may even make the mistake on their own. In Felde v.
Butler, Mr. Felde told the jurors that they should sentence him to death. 817 F.2d 281,
282 (5th Cir. 1987). When the jury did so, it sent a note with its verdict which spoke of
the regard the jurors had for Mr. Felde as a Viet Nam veteran, and also noted "we felt
that Mr. Felde was aware of right and wrong when [the victim's] life was taken." Id. at
282 n.1.
232. Morgan, 639 So. 2d at 13-14; Hunter, 869 S.W.2d at 726-27; State v. English.
367 So. 2d 815, 819 (La. 1979) (setting aside death sentence because the jury was not
instructed properly on the defendant's mental disability); Lawrence v. State, 541
N.E.2d 451, 460 (Ohio 1989) (vacating death sentence in part because the defendant's
impaired mental state made the death penalty inappropriate); Lewis, 380 So. 2d at
976-78 (reversing death sentence due to the defendant's subnormal mental capacity).
Cf. Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1043-45 (finding counsel was ineffective at sentencing for
not investigating or presenting relevant mental problems as mitigating sentence);
Starr, 23 F.3d at 1290-93 (holding that the denial of psychiatric expert for sentencing
was not harmless error); Kenley, 937 F.2d at 1307-08 (finding counsel provided inef-
fective assistance of counsel by not investigating or presenting mitigating evidence of
mental impairment).
233. Brown, 577 N.E.2d at 234 (affirming death sentence where the trial court re-
fused to find "extreme emotional or mental disturbance" because the defendant's
conduct was not extreme enough to excuse his conduct, but the trial court also found
the defendant possessed the "substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of her
conduct and to conform her conduct"); State v. Perry, 502 So. 2d 543, 561 (La. 1986)
(affirming the death sentence because the jury chose to believe defendant was not
insane or unable to control or understand actions); Holloway, 527 N.E.2d at 839 (af-
firming death sentence because testimony about the defendant knowing right from
wrong diminished the significance of mitigating factor regarding substantial impair-
ment); State v. Brett, 892 P.2d 29, 61 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (holding that the prose-
cutor's argument that the defendant knew right from wrong was not error because the
prosecutor did not mention insanity and the defendant could have argued evidence
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what surprisingly, the same appellate courts may apply the tests
accurately in one case, but not in the next case.23n One commentator
argues that this inconsistency across and within jurisdictions demon-
strates an absence of "a principled consideration of reduced responsi-
bility."'' 35 This erratic treatment of mental disabilities also may reflect
a fundamental unwillingness to sustain the certain difference between
the guilt and punishment determinations.
a. Courts that Recognize the Difference Between Mental Disease or
Defect as a Factor at the Guilt or Punishment Phases
Courts that recognize the distinction between mental disabilities as
they affect guilt and as they mitigate punishment, contribute to our
understanding of the different purposes of the guilt and punishment
phases. For example, in State v. English,36 the Louisiana Supreme
Court recognized that once a defendant has been found guilty, "an-
other dimension of his mental condition comes into play as affecting
whether the jury shall recommend that he be put to death. ' 237 In
other words, a defendant's mental illness may or may not affect his
guilt, but the jury must newly reconsider the defendant's mental ill-
ness because it informs whether the defendant is worthy of death.
In English, the Louisiana Supreme Court set aside English's death
sentence and remanded for resentencing because the jury had not
been permitted to consider English's psychiatric illness as a circum-
stance that could mitigate his punishment. The trial court properly
instructed the jury on insanity at the guilt phase, 8 but refused the
defendant's request to specially instruct the jury at the punishment
phase on the meaning of the mitigating circumstance regarding mental
disease or defect.239 Thus, the only instruction the jury received with
justified a sentence less than death even if it did not reduce his moral culpability);
Berard, 402 So. 2d at 1051 (holding that the trial court's characterization of the de-
fendant's mitigating evidence of emotional instability as not excusing or justifying
criminal conduct and as showing he appreciated the consequences of his conduct was
"tantamount" to mitigating factors about mental disabilities).
234. See, e.g., supra Part H.B.1.b.
235. George E. Dix, Psychological Abnormality and Capital Sentencing, 7 Int'l. J.L.
& Psychiatry 249, 259 (1984) (arguing that decisions claiming to turn on the presence
of mental disabilities not properly considered at the trial level may actually turn on
other issues in the case such as concern over a death sentence in a non-homicide case
or a trial court overriding the jury's life sentence recommendation).
236. 367 So. 2d 815 (La. 1979).
237. Id. at 819.
238. Id. at 818 ("[A]n insane person is one who is incapable of distinguishing be-
tween right and wrong.").
239. Id. The mitigating circumstance was: "At the time of the offense the capacity
of the offender to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease of [sic] defect or
intoxication." Id. The special instruction the defense requested was:
[A] mental defect would be a defect or deficiency in the emotional, psychic,
or intellectual function of a person which rendered the mind deficient for the
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respect to how to evaluate English's mental disability was that given at
the guilt phase.' At the punishment phase, two psychiatrists testified
that English knew right from wrong and suffered from a "severe psy-
chiatric illness."' 41 The prosecutor, in his closing argument at the pun-
ishment phase, relied heavily on the psychiatrist's testimony that
English "knew right from wrong" and reminded the jury that mental
diseases or defects do not "affect the criminal responsibility of an
individual. 2 42
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that, under these circumstances,
English was entitled to a special instruction explaining the difference
between a mental disease or defect constituting insanity or a mitigat-
ing circumstance. 243 The prosecutor's emphasis on English's "criminal
responsibility," coupled with the absence of an instruction on the miti-
gating factor, resulted in the jury being led to believe that the same
test applied at both phases. According to the Court, the legislature
intended the jury to be able to consider an "abnormal mental condi-
tion short of legal insanity"'  that diminished the defendant's capac-
ity for self control, capacity to form the intent to kill, or some other
mental disease or defect "affecting the act"'"z 5 that would cause the
jury not to impose the death penalty. By failing to make this distinc-
tion clear, the trial court denied the jury the opportunity to consider
the separate punishment question of how the defendant's mental disa-
bility affected whether the jury should sentence him to life imprison-
ment or death. '
In a related vein, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit recognized that the different legal tests for mental disabilities
adhering at the guilt and punishment phases also require a different
standard of investigation for defense counsel. 47 In Hendricks v. Cal-
purpose for which the mind is to be used. Mental disease means a person is
suffering from an illness which lessens his capacity to use his customary self-
control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social rela-
tions .... A mental disease or defect is not to be confused with insanity, as to
which you have been previously instructed.
Id.
240. 1&L at 819. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that the trial court "ap-
parently accept[ed]" the state's argument that the insanity and mitigating circum-
stances tests were the same. Id. at 818-19.






247. Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043-45 (9th Cir. 1995); Clabourne v.
Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing, in part because his cross-examination
of the state's witnesses focused solely on Mr. Clabourne's sanity at the time of the
crime, not on the mitigation standard).
19971
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
deron,2" the court found defense counsel ineffective for failing to in-
vestigate mitigating evidence related to Hendricks's mental
problems, 49 despite the fact that the attorney's investigation for the
guilt phase did not reveal a plausible defense based on mental ill-
ness.2?0 The court rejected the prosecutor's argument that the investi-
gation for both was the same: "The differing legal standards in the
guilt and penalty phases render this argument a nonsequitur." 1 Cit-
ing California's mitigating factors, 2 the court explained that evidence
of mental problems may be insufficient to provide a defense at the
guilt phase, but proper as mitigation at the punishment phase.2s3 Be-
cause the substantive standards were different, the court recognized
that the investigation would be different as well.254
b. Courts that Conflate the Difference Between Mental Disease or
Defect as a Factor at the Guilt or Punishment Phases
While many courts recognize the differences between the jury's con-
sideration of mental disabilities at the guilt and punishment phases,
others fail to appreciate the significance of the shift in focus from con-
viction to sentence. z5 A series of decisions in Ohio provide insight
into this misperception.
Prior to 1990, the insanity test in Ohio was: "whether a defendant,
.. as a result of mental disease or defect .... does not have the capac-
ity either to know the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law." 6 As a mitigating factor, a
mental disease or defect was relevant when "at the time of committing
248. 70 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1995).
249. The Court held that even if the investigation into mental impairment had been
sufficient, counsel's overall investigation would still have been deficient because he
did not investigate Mr. Hendricks's hard childhood and drug problems, which were
"independent of [his] psychiatric problems." Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1044.
250. Id. at 1042. Defense counsel's own experts did not believe a mental disability
defense existed. Id.
251. Id. at 1043.
252. Id. (citing Cal. Penal Code § 190.3 (d) (extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance) and (h) (impaired capacity due to mental disease or defect or intoxication)).
253. lId at 1043-44.
254. The Court concluded that not only was counsel's performance deficient be-
cause he failed to conduct a proper investigation, but the "storehouse of information
chronicling Hendricks' miserable life" sufficiently undermined confidence in the out-
come of the punishment phase to satisfy the prejudice prong of the ineffective assist-
ance of counsel test under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-91 (1984). Id.
at 1044-45.
255. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 231 & infra note 271 and accompanying text.
256. State v. Claytor, 574 N.E.2d 472, 479 (Ohio 1991) (emphasis added) (quoting
State v. Staten, 247 N.E.2d 293 paragraph one of the syllabus (Ohio 1969)). In Ohio,
the syllabus is the official language of the Court. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broad., 433 U.S. 562, 566 n.3 (1977) (recognizing that one may consult text of opinion
to understand syllabus); Ohio Sup. Ct. R. for the Reporting of Opinions 1(B) (West
1997) (syllabus states controlling points of law). In 1990 the definition changed: It
now applies only to "one who did not know, as a result of a severe mental disease or
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the offense, the offender, because of a mental disease or defect, lacked
substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law."" Either as a
mitigating factor or as insanity, the mental disease or defect could af-
fect the defendant's cognitive or volitional capacities.-5 8 But the in-
sanity test imposed a higher standard of disability than the mitigating
test. Insanity required a complete lack of capacity while, if offered in
mitigation, the defendant needed to exhibit only a substantial lack of
capacity.?6 9 Despite the difference between the two tests, the case law
demonstrates that prosecutors and courts, including the Ohio
Supreme Court, often treat them as the same.
In State v. Holloway,26° for example, the Ohio Supreme Court's in-
dependent review of the mitigating evidence appeared to collapse the
insanity and mitigating tests into one. Although acknowledging the
language of the mitigating factor, the Court relied on language more
closely associated with the insanity test in weighing the defendant's
mitigating evidence.
Holloway was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder with
aggravating circumstances261 and sentenced to death. He presented
no evidence at the guilt phase but presented substantial evidence at
the punishment phase regarding his mental disabilities, character, and
background. Family members testified that Holloway was born physi-
cally deformed, was mildly retarded, and was physically abused as a
child by his father. 62 Two clinical psychologists testified that Hollo-
way was mildly retarded, had an antisocial personality disorder, and
defect, the wrongfulness of his acts." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.01(A)(14) (Ander-
son 1995) (enacted by 1990 Ohio Laws 340).
257. Claytor, 574 N.E.2d at 479-80 (emphasis added in part) (quoting Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2929.04(B)(3)). This factor did not change when the legislature modi-
fied the definition of insanity. Thus, today, a defendant could raise his incapacity to
conform his conduct to the law as a mitigating factor, but not as a defense to the
murder.
258. A mental disorder that does not constitute a mental disease or defect may be
considered under the catch-all factor "any other factors that are relevant to the issue
of whether the offender should be sentenced to death." State v. Cooey, 544 N.E.2d
895, 915 (Ohio 1989) (citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04(B)(7)).
259. See Cooey, 544 N.E.2d at 918 ("The question [at the punishment phase] was
not, as the trial court thought, whether Cooey completely lacked capacity" but
whether he lacked "substantial capacity"). In Cooey the Ohio Supreme Court held
that the trial court misapplied the punishment-phase test, but did not reverse because
Cooey did not suffer from a mental disease or defect. Il
260. 527 N.E.2d 831 (Ohio 1988).
261. In Ohio "aggravated murder" is the highest degree of murder. See supra note
7. For a defendant to be death eligible, the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt at least one aggravating circumstance---called a "specification"-at the guilt
phase. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04(A) (Anderson 1995). Here, the aggravating
circumstances were that the offense was committed in the course of an aggravated




suffered organic brain damage.263 Both experts concluded that Hollo-
way lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law2 4-
framed in the operative language of the mitigating factor.265  Of
greater importance to the Ohio Supreme Court in its independent
weighing of the evidence was the psychologists' additional testimony
that Holloway knew right from wrong and could control his behav-
ior. 66 The court found that this testimony about "knowing right from
wrong" diminished the significance of the evidence supporting the
mitigating factor.2 67 Indeed, the court concluded that Holloway's his-
tory, character, and background served to explain his character devel-
opment rather than his substantial inability to appropriately think and
behave. The court concluded that "despite all," his actions and the
experts' testimony showed that "he was able to distinguish between
right and wrong."2"
Certainly, it is appropriate for a court to find that although a miti-
gating factor has been established, it is outweighed by the aggravating
factors,269 or even to find that the mitigating factor has not been es-
tablished.2 70 For a court to find that a mental disease or defect when
used as a mitigating factor is diminished or negated by applying a
guilt-phase test, however, is indefensible.2 7' By doing so in Holloway,
the court infused into the punishment-phase judgment a higher stan-
dard for mental disease or defect than was statutorily permitted. The
question whether Holloway knew right from wrong was no longer an
issue; he was convicted of aggravated murder with specifications.272
263. IdL at 833, 838.
264. Id at 838.
265. Id at 835 n.1.
266. Id at 838. While not precisely the same language as the operative insanity
test, supra note 256, it was virtually identical.
267. IdL at 839.
268. Id
269. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 595 N.E2d 884, 901 (Ohio 1992) (finding that mitigating
evidence of mental retardation, youth, and family life were outweighed by the aggra-
vating circumstances of the brutal manner of killing).
270. See State v. Cooey, 544 N.E.2d 895, 918 (Ohio 1989).
271. The Court made this same analytic error in State v. Spisak. 521 N.E.2d 800,
803 (Ohio 1988) (noting that the defendant relied on mental disease or defect as a
mitigating factor and testimony showed he had the "characteristics of borderline and
schizotypal personality disorder" but testimony established that he was "sane at the
time of the acts, he could have refrained from committing them, had he so chosen,
and he understood the nature of his acts but elected to carry them out anyway"); see
also State v. Hill, 595 N.Ed.2d 884, 901 (Ohio 1992) (weighing of aggravators and
mitigators showed "very tenuous relationship" between murder and degree of mental
retardation: the defendant was not psychotic and knew right from wrong); State v.
Bedford, 529 N.E.2d 913, 924 (Ohio 1988) (weighing of aggravators and mitigators
included little weight given to lack of substantial capacity mitigating factor because
defendant knew right from wrong).
272. Holloway, 527 N.E. 2d at 833. In Holloway's case, whether he knew right from




By employing the right-from-wrong test at the punishment phase the
court in effect merely reaffirmed the conviction. It did not properly
consider the existence of mitigating factors as a matter separate from
Holloway's guilt.273
A year later, in State v. Lawrence, 74 the Ohio Supreme Court be-
haved in the opposite fashion. The court not only articulated the dif-
ferent tests, it also recognized the necessity, in some circumstances, of
ensuring that the trial court does not mislead a jury into concluding
that the tests are the same.27s At the guilt phase of Lawrence's trial, a
clinical psychologist testified that Lawrence suffered from four disor-
ders276 and that Lawrence could not distinguish right from wrong or
control his behavior at the time he committed the murders? 7
Although the State's experts disagreed about Lawrence's ability to
know right from wrong, they did agree that he suffered from post
traumatic stress disorder, one of the four identified disorders. 78 The
jury rejected the insanity defense and convicted Lawrence of two
counts of aggravated murder with aggravating circumstancesv 9 At
the punishment phase, Lawrence presented no additional expert testi-
mony regarding his mental state.28 The prosecutor, in his closing ar-
gument at the punishment phase, argued that no difference existed
between insanity and the related mitigating factor:
And here is the big one. You know this is the deja vu. This is the
one, go back and reconsider the fact whether at the time of commit-
ting the offense the offender, because of mental disease or defect,
lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law.
273. This is especially troubling in Holloway because the first holding of the case
was that mitigating factors are not related to a defendant's culpability but to his pun-
ishment. Id. at 835. Although casting its later discussion in terms of punishment, the
court, wrongly by its own terms, retained a focus on culpability.
274. 541 N.B.2d 451 (Ohio 1989).
275. Id. at 456-57. One might speculate that this is an example of Professor Dix's
observation, supra note 235, that factors other than the defendant's mental disease or
defect may influence the court's treatment of that factor. Compare, for example, the
victims in Holloway as opposed to Lawrence: In Holloway, where the court affirmed
the conviction and sentence, the victim was an 84-year-old woman, previously a stran-
ger to Mr. Holloway, whom he killed by strangulation and beating, 527 N.E.2d at 832-
33, whereas in Lawrence, a case in which the court reversed the death sentence, the
victims were Mr. Lawrence's neighbors whom he shot after a particularly intense and
hostile argument, 541 N.E.2d at 453. It may be that the court perceived a qualitative
difference in the murders based on whether the defendant knew the victim or not and
that this difference may account for the otherwise seemingly inexplicable disparate
handling of mental illness as a mitigating factor.
276. Lawrence, 541 N.E.2d at 453 (listing these disorders as: major depression, post
traumatic stress disorder, dissociative disorder, and schizotypal personality disorder).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 454.
279. See id
280. Id. at 457.
1997I]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Haven't you heard that before. Wasn't that the test we just went
through? You already addressed this issue. You want to address it
again, fine. Go back and address it again. 28 1
Because this argument misstated the relevant tests and the trial court
failed to instruct the jury to disregard the statement, the Ohio
Supreme Court held that Lawrence was denied the opportunity to
have the jury consider his mental condition as a mitigating factor. In-
stead of understanding that a different standard applied at punish-
ment, the jury was left to believe it should consider his mental
disability according to the same high standard the jury had considered
and then rejected at the guilt phase.23 2 The jury recommended that
Lawrence should be sentenced to death.283
The Ohio Supreme Court found that the trial court committed the
same error as the prosecutor in its own independent weighing of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances as required by Ohio law.2a
The trial court found that the post traumatic stress disorder did not
impair Lawrence's reasoning sufficiently to preclude knowledge of
right from wrong or to preclude behavior control.285 The Ohio
Supreme Court held that even though the trial court opinion later re-
cited the correct mitigating standard, it applied the higher insanity test
and thus failed to consider the mitigating value of the evidence.28 6
Subsequently, in the Ohio Supreme Court's own independent
weighing of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, it con-
cluded that Lawrence "did lack substantial capacity. '' 287 The court
emphasized that a mental disability need not rise to the level of in-
sanity to be considered as mitigating. Although Lawrence's mental
disorders did not "excuse his conduct, they [were] certainly relevant as
mitigating factors." 288 Based on its conclusion that the aggravating
circumstances did not outweigh the mitigating circumstances, the
court vacated Lawrence's two death sentences.289
281. Id. at 456 n.5.
282. Id. at 457. The Ohio Supreme Court found that the prosecutor's closing argu-
ment was exacerbated by an instruction that defined a mitigating circumstance as one
"extenuating or reducing the degree of the defendant's blame or punishment." Id.
While the court was clear that mitigation is not related to culpability but to whether
the defendant should be sentenced to death, the combination of this instruction and
the prosecutor's misstatement "improperly raise[d] the mitigating factor of appellant's
mental state to the level of the defense of insanity." Id.
283. Id at 454.
284. Id. at 457.
285. Id
286. Id.
287. Id. at 460.
288. Id
289. Id at 460. Because the court vacated the two death sentences based on its
own independent weighing, it considered moot the trial court errors. Id. at 456. It
addressed the errors made by the prosecutor and the trial court to "prevent[ ] such
error in the future." Id.
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Despite prosecutors and lower courts repeatedly conflating the tests
governing the relevance of a defendant's mental disease or defect,z 0
the Ohio Supreme Court persists in holding that, as a general rule,
trial courts need not explain the difference to jurors.291 This apparent
intransigence raises concerns about the court's commitment to honor-
ing the distinction between the guilt and punishment phases. When
lower courts and prosecutors continue to treat the punishment phase
as an abridged version of the guilt phase by merging the tests regard-
ing a defendant's mental disabilities, it should come as no surprise that
juries might do this as well.292 Higher courts should insist that trial
courts address this error at its source rather than wait for appellate
review. As a matter of course, trial courts should properly instruct the
jury on the relationship between the two phases. 293 When relevant, as
in Holloway and Lawrence, courts should also instruct juries on the
difference between the tests governing the role of the defendant's
mental disabilities.
Courts that correctly perceive the difference between the guilt and
punishment decisions-exemplified here by the difference between
mental disease or defect as insanity or as a mitigating factor-recog-
nize where other courts err. The difference is not merely one of se-
mantics but of substantively separate concepts that require their own
290. E.g., State v. Claytor, 574 N.E.2d 472, 481 (Ohio 1991) (pointing out that trial
and appellate courts "blended" insanity and mitigating tests); State v. Cooey, 544
N.E.2d 895, 918 (Ohio 1989) (stating that trial court applied insanity test to mitigating
factor); Lawrence, 541 N.E2d at 457 (finding that the prosecutor told the jury the
tests were the same and the trial court failed to correct). The Ohio Supreme Court
itself sometimes equates the two tests in its own independent weighing of aggravating
circumstances and mitigating factors. E.g., State v. Hill, 595 N.E.2d 884, 901 (Ohio
1992); State v. Holloway, 527 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ohio 1988); State v. Bedford, 529
N.E.2d 913, 924 (Ohio 1988); State v. Spisak, 521 N.E.2d 800, 803 (Ohio 1988); see
also Daniel D. Domozick, Note, Fact or Fiction: Mitigating the Death Penalty in Ohio,
32 Clev. St. L. Rev. 263, 268-78 (1983-84) (analyzing the problems created by the
similarity between the two tests and proposing that if a jury finds the defendant sub-
stantially impaired, the death penalty should be precluded as a possible punishment).
291. State v. Rogers, 478 N.E.2d 984, paragraph five of the syllabus (Ohio 1985)
(holding that the trial court was not obligated to explain the distinction). This conclu-
sion apparently arose from the court's concern that any definition could be seen as
restricting the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence. Id at 993. As this analysis
shows, defining and restricting are not necessarily the same. See also State v. Claytor,
574 N.E.2d 472, 480, 481-82 (Ohio 1991) (rejecting appellant's contention that jury
instructions were required because the difference between insanity and the mitigating
factor was "too subtle" for jurors to understand, but reversing because the trial and
appellate courts "blended" the two standards, raising serious questions about whether
either gave mitigating evidence appropriate weight).
292. See, e.g., Felde v. Butler, 817 F.2d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 1987) (providing example
of jurors using the right-from-wrong test in assessing death penalty); Michael L Per-
lin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of "Mitigat-
ing" Mental Disability Evidence, 8 Notre Dame J.L Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 239 (1994)
(challenging the assumption that jurors accurately apply law regarding mental disabil-
ities as a mitigating factor).
293. See infra note 347 and accompanying text.
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investigation, presentation, explanation, and evaluation. Even while
focused on the defendant's mental state, the inquiry into his "degree
of culpability" both transcends and transforms what was previously
established at the guilt phase. The jury's consideration of the defend-
ant's mental state takes on a different character as well as a new di-
mension. Restricting the punishment-phase standard for mental
disabilities to that required for the guilt phase denies the jury an op-
portunity to fairly consider whether the defendant is worthy of a death
sentence, and prevents the jury from fulfilling its obligation to do so.
2. Criminal Responsibility
Perhaps the most striking example of a court conflating the guilt
and punishment decisions occurs when a court views a defendant's
proffer of mitigating evidence as an attempt to avoid criminal respon-
sibility for the offense. In two Texas cases, a federal district court
found that each proffer of mitigating evidence was unavailing because,
as the court characterized the defendants' arguments, "[the defend-
ant's] circumstances were pitiful as a child; therefore he is not respon-
sible for his acts. '294 But to the court's mind, "[f]reedom necessarily
implies responsibility; [the defendant] abused his freedom. He must
bear the consequences the State of Texas has prescribed .... 2 95 This
attitude, however, revealed a fundamental misunderstanding of the
purpose of the mitigating evidence. The purpose of mitigating evi-
dence is to influence the punishment decision, it is not to revoke or
negate the guilty verdict.296 The district court considered the mitigat-
ing evidence as disparaging the guilty verdict rather than as affecting
whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprison-
ment.297 By importing guilt-phase concepts of criminal responsibility
294. Quoted in Motley v. Collins, 3 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter "Mot-
ley P'] (withdrawn by panel and substituted by 18 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir.)), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 418 (1994)) [hereinafter "Motley IF']. The same judge made this identical
analysis two years earlier in another Texas case. See Buxton v. Collins, No. H-91-494,
slip op. at 6 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 1991) (on file with author), affd on other grounds, 925
F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1991). In each case the defendant claimed that the Texas death
penalty statute prevented the jury from considering mitigating evidence of childhood
abuse. See Motley 1, 3 F.3d at 786 (noting that the defendant argued that the jury
could not give mitigating weight to the evidence); Buxton, 925 F.2d at 822 (stating that
the defendant argued that mitigating evidence was not presented to the jury because
the statute prevented the jury from giving mitigating weight to the evidence).
295. Motley 11, 18 F.3d at 1228; Buxton, slip op. at 6-7 (using identical language).
296. As the Fifth Circuit later reasoned, "[Tlhe district court's analysis confuses the
definition of mitigating evidence, a term that is only relevant to the question of pun-
ishment, with the definition of justification or excuse, concepts that are relevant to a
criminal defendant's guilt or innocence." Motley I, 3 F.3d at 787.
297. Indeed, the district court opined:
Child abuse is tragic for anyone, but its ability to break the causal connec-
tion between the free will of the defendant and the fate of his victim has
never been suggested.... Motley's position [that his abuse as a child justi-
fied murdering an innocent passer-by] is an insult to people everywhere who
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into the punishment-phase analysis, the district court eviscerated the
separate significance of the punishment-phase decision.
C. Requiring A Nexus Between the Crime and Mitigating Evidence
of Mental Disabilities
A third way courts merge the guilt and punishment determinations
is exemplified by cases that demand a nexus between mitigating evi-
dence of mental disabilities and the crime. In a series of cases inter-
preting the application of Penry v. Lynaugh,29s the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has devised a test that requires
a causal link between the defendant's mitigating evidence of mental
disabilities and the commission of the crime.29 This requirement is
erroneous and unconstitutional because it conflates the punishment
inquiry into a defendant's deathworthiness with the guilt-phase in-
quiry into his culpability.
As discussed previously, Penry held that the Texas death penalty
special-issue questions-concerning the defendant's deliberate com-
mission of the crime and his future dangerousness-violated the Con-
stitution by preventing the jury from considering and giving mitigating
effect to Penry's evidence of mental retardation and the long-term
psychological effects of childhood abuse.300 Since Penry was an as-
applied challenge and the Supreme Court did not provide specific gui-
dance on how to remedy the constitutional violation, it was incumbent
have overcome their injuries and deprivations to become successful contrib-
uting members of our community."
Motley , 18 F.3d at 1228. The district court concluded, "[M]urders are committed by
people who were not abused, contradicting the causal inference Motley wants the
court to make." Id. This misconstrued Mr. Motley's argument, see supra note 294, as
well as the difference between guilt and punishment.
298. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
299. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has developed a similar test: To obtain
relief under Penry, a defendant must establish "a nexus between [the mitigating] evi-
dence and the circumstances of the offense which tends to excuse or explain the com-
mission of the offense, suggesting that particular defendant is less deserving of a death
sentence." Mines v. State, 852 S.W.2d 941, 951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (citations omit-
ted), vacated and remanded, 510 U.S. 802 (1993), aff'd on remand, 888 S.W.2d 816
(Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc). Since the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
adopted this narrow test it has granted relief only in cases where the defendant, like
Mr. Peary, presented evidence of mental retardation. See eg., Ex pane McGee, 817
S.W.2d 77, 80 (rex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc); Deborah W. Denno, Testing Penry
and Its Progeny, 22 Am. 3. Crim. L. 1 (1994) (critiquing Penry and the Texas court's
nexus requirement); Peggy M. Tobolowsky, What Hath Penry Wrought? Mitigating
Circumstances and the Texas Death Penalty, 19 Am. J. Crim. L 345 (1992) (examiningjudicial and legislative responses to Penry). This section's analysis of the limitations
of the Fifth Circuit test applies equally to the Texas court's decisions. Not all courts
interpret Penry as restrictively as Texas and the Fifth Circuit, however. Se4 e.g., State
v. Wagner, 786 P.2d 93, 101 (Or. 1990) (en banc) (rejecting State's argument that
mitigating evidence could be constitutionally limited to evidence causally related to
the offense).
300. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
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on the lower courts to articulate Penry's parameters. The lower courts
needed to resolve how Penry's rationale applied to other kinds of miti-
gating evidence that a defendant argued could not be given mitigating
weight under the two special issue questions.
The Fifth Circuit, in response, developed a two-part test: to consti-
tute a Penry claim,3"' the evidence must be "constitutionally relevant
mitigating evidence, ' '302 and, if so, the evidence must be beyond the
"effective reach of the jurors. ' 30 3 "Constitutionally relevant mitigat-
ing evidence" is evidence that demonstrates that the defendant is less
culpable for the crime by showing: "(1) a 'uniquely severe permanent
handicap[ ] with which the defendant was burdened through no fault
of his own,' . . . and (2) that the criminal act was attributable to this
severe permanent condition. ' '301 If mitigating evidence meets this
301. In other words, to answer the question, what mitigating evidence presented at
trial could the jury not consider and give mitigating effect to under the two special-
issue questions regarding deliberateness and future dangerousness. Arguably, this is a
harmless error test, but the Fifth Circuit has never analyzed mitigating evidence as
such under Brecht v. Abrahamson. 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (holding that on federal
habeas review constitutional error requires reversal only if it "had substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict" (quoting Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). The Fifth Circuit has applied Brecht to other
alleged punishment phase errors. See, e.g., Woods v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 1017, 1026-33
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 150 (1996).
302. Madden v. Collins, 18 F.3d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis omitted), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1114 (1995).
303. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993)).
304. Davis v. Scott, 51 F.3d 457, 460-61 (5th Cir.) (quoting Graham v. Collins, 950
F.2d 1009, 1029 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 461 (1993)),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 525 (1995). The Fifth Circuit has not granted relief in any case
under this test. See, e.g., Harris v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 535, 539 (5th Cir.) (assuming that
borderline intelligence is a severe permanent handicap, no nexus was shown), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1863 (1996); Allridge v. Scott, 41 F.3d 213,223 (5th Cir. 1994) (hold-
ing that father's non-expert testimony about mental illness did not establish required
linkage), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1959 (1995); Motley II, 18 F.3d 1223, 1235 & n.10 (5th
Cir.) (finding that child abuse, even if constitutionally mitigating, may be considered
under future dangerousness), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 418 (1994); Madden, 18 F.3d at
308 (stating that mental illness, learning disabilities, and troubled childhood did not
rise to level of constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence); Barnard v. Collins, 958
F.2d 634, 639 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding no evidence of psychological effects of troubled
childhood), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1057 (1993); Graham, 950 F.2d at 1030-32 (holding
that youth is a transitory state that may be considered under future dangerousness).
The Fifth Circuit attributes the origin of this test to language in Penry, that "defend-
ants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or
to emotional and mental problems may be less culpable than defendants who have no
such excuse." Penry, 494 U.S. at 319 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545
(1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)); see, e.g., Davis, 51 F.3d at 460. This language
cannot support the Fifth Circuit's narrow construction. First, the test is not limited to
"uniquely severe permanent handicaps," but contemplates a much broader source of
difficulties: disadvantaged background as well as emotional and mental problems,
without any qualification. Second, although the Supreme Court has not elaborated
on the meaning of this phrase, opinions by its author, Justice O'Connor, suggest it
does not require the high level of causation the Fifth Circuit adopted. Justice
O'Connor first used this language in California v. Brown to explain her understanding
that the sentence in a death penalty case should reflect a reasoned moral response,
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test, then the trial court should have given the jury additional instruc-
tions beyond the two special issue questions that would have allowed
the jury to give mitigating effect to the evidence.
The Fifth Circuit's construction of relevant mitigating evidence is
unduly restrictive. First, it limits the mitigating relevance of mental
disabilities to the defendant's culpability for the crime.305 This ignores
the broader role mitigating evidence plays in informing the jury's de-
termination of whether the defendant is worthy of a death sentence.
Second, it effectively eviscerates a defendant's lesser culpability, even
as reconceptualized as a sentencing concern. 30 6
Evidence of a defendant's reduced culpability, under the Fifth Cir-
cuit's test, is limited, first, by the kind of mental disability deemed
relevant to a defendant's culpability. The test requires that the mental
disability be both "uniquely severe" and "permanent." 31 Apart from
acknowledging that Penry's mental retardation constituted a severe,
permanent handicap, 08 the Fifth Circuit has given little guidance as to
rather that mere sympathy, to a defendant's background, character, and crime. 479
U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring). She again used it in her dissent in
South Carolina v. Gathers to explain why evidence that the defendant was an affec-
tionate and caring person was constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence: "Evi-
dence extraneous to the crime itself is deemed relevant and indeed, constitutionally
so," because of society's belief about defendants, as reflected in the significance of
their background and problems described in the quotation. 490 U.S. 805, 817 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Although unrelated to the crime, she
concluded, this evidence was relevant to the jury's assessment of respondent himself
and his moral blameworthiness. Penry, 492 U.S. at 318. This is strong support for the
claim that the punishment-phase connection between the defendant's problems and
his culpability is not limited to the commission of the crime, but encompasses a
broader inquiry about the defendant's moral blameworthiness as that informs the sen-
tencing decision. It may be that mitigating evidence directly related to the defend-
ant's culpability for the crime, that explains why he committed the crime, is most
persuasive and compelling, see Hill v. Lockhart, 28 F.3d 832, 846 (8th Cir. 1994), but
that does not make this direct relationship constitutionally necessary.
305. See supra Part I.B.4. In this respect, the Fifth Circuit reads Penry far too liter-
ally. See supra note 112. While a juror still may consider a defendant's mental disabil-
ities in relation to the special-issue questions, neither of these necessarily allow the
jury to consider the mitigating effect of the evidence. See infra notes 321-27 and ac-
companying text. Deliberateness remains focused on the crime, and future danger-
ousness, while independent of the crime, still does not fully address the defendant's
deathworthiness.
306. See supra Part I.B.1.
307. Arguably this test is even more restrictive than that required for a mental dis-
ease or defect in the insanity test. If so, this runs counter to the admonition in Ed-
dings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982), that mitigating evidence need not rise
to the level of a defense; see also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 363 (1993) (stating
that under the Texas death penalty statute, the jury "could also consider whether the
defendant was under an extreme form of mental or emotional pressure, something
less, perhaps, than insanity, but more than the emotions of the average man, however
inflamed, could withstand") (emphasis added) (quoting Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d
934, 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (en banc)).
308. Graham, 950 F.2d at 1029.
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what else would qualify.30 9 The court has suggested that some kind of
brain damage310 or adverse effects from childhood abuse31' might sat-
isfy this requirement, but either must still bear some causal relation-
ship to the criminal act.312
Despite the high standard imposed on the type of mental disability,
the second requirement is even more problematic. In this regard, the
Fifth Circuit has required that the commission of the crime be "attrib-
utable" to this uniquely severe permanent handicap to be considered
as reducing a defendant's culpability. 1 3 While the defendant's culpa-
bility reconceptualized as a punishment-phase issue is related to his
culpability for the crime, the connection the Fifth Circuit imposes is so
close to the guilt-phase notion of culpability as to make them indistin-
guishable. In Madden v. Collins,314 for example, the Fifth Circuit held
that evidence of a mental illness was not constitutionally relevant miti-
gating evidence, in large part because Madden could still understand
the wrongfulness of his actions.315 A clinical psychologist testified
that Madden suffered from a personality avoidance disorder, a mental
illness that impaired his ability "to think and react in a logical man-
ner."316 According to the expert, this personality disorder combined
with Madden's long-term drug abuse caused him to suffer from dimin-
ished capacity. The expert defined diminished capacity as "a deterio-
309. E.g., Davis, 51 F.3d at 461-62 (finding that the evidence did not establish sexu-
ally deviant behavior that was uniquely severe and permanent, but not discussing
whether psychotic disorders constituted a handicap because they were not linked to
the criminal act, discounting possible childhood abuse and neglect because the de-
fendant did not point to evidence of traumatic psychological effects or linkage to the
crime).
310. See Madden, 18 F.3d at 308 (stating that the requirement that a handicap be
"uniquely severe" means not all organic brain damage will qualify, it is merely an
example of what qualifies at a minimum: organic brain impairment in the form of a
learning disorder does not qualify); Harris, 81 F.3d at 539 (assuming that borderline
intelligence is a severe permanent handicap).
311. See Barnard v. Collins, 958 F.2d 634, 638-39 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that no
evidence was presented that showed psychological effects of troubled childhood). In
the initial Motley opinion, the court held that the defendant's evidence of child abuse
was constitutionally mitigating and could not be considered within the scope of the
Texas special issues. Motley 1, 3 F.3d at 790-94. In the substituted opinion, however,
the court changed its analysis and merely assumed Motley's evidence of child abuse
was constitutionally mitigating. Motley II, 18 F.3d at 1235 n.10.
312. Harris, 81 F.3d at 539; Davis, 51 F.3d at 462; Allridge, 41 F.3d at 223; Madden,
18 F.3d at 308; Motley II, 18 F.3d at 1235 n.10; Barnard, 958 F.2d at 638.
313. Madden, 18 F.3d at 307 (using "clear nexus" also); Barnard, 958 F.2d at 638;
see also Harris, 81 F.3d at 539 (finding no nexus between the mitigating evidence and
the murder); Davis, 51 F.3d at 461 (stating that the defendant "failed to link any
psychiatric problems he may have suffered to the murder"); Allridge, 41 F.3d at 223
(holding that the defendant failed to show "linkage"); Madden, 18 F.3d at 307 (stating
that the handicap must be "directly responsible for the instant crime").
314. 18 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 1994).
315. Id. at 307. The court also found it relevant that testimony that the mental
illness made the defendant more aggressive or violent was "conspicuously absent." Id.
316. Id.
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ration or distortion of one's ability to make logical and rational
decisions. 317 The Fifth Circuit found it significant that Madden did
not present any evidence that he could not control his behavior or
distinguish right from wrong.318 In concert with an absence of evi-
dence that the mental disorder made Madden more aggressive than
others, there existed "insubstantial evidence" that committing the cap-
ital murder was "attributable" to his mental illness.3 19 The court ap-
pears to have relied heavily on what is, in essence, a guilt-phase
standard of insanity to decide whether the defendant's evidence con-
stituted "constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence" for the sen-
tencing decision. 0
The Fifth Circuit's limitations on mental disabilities as mitigating
evidence are compounded by the jury's inability to consider this evi-
dence within the initial two special issue questions regarding deliber-
ateness and future dangerousness. Certainly the question of whether
the defendant committed the crime deliberately is related to the de-
fendant's culpability for the crime. But, as Penry recognized, personal
culpability is not solely a function of the capacity to act deliberately."
Without a jury instruction defining deliberateness in a way that directs
the jury to consider the defendant's mitigating evidence in relation to
his personal culpability, that evidence may not receive proper consid-
eration.3 2 Yet, under the Fifth Circuit's construction, a defendant is
not entitled to this additional instruction unless he first satisfies the
narrow nexus test. The result of the Fifth Circuit's test is that unless
the mitigating evidence demonstrates a uniquely severe, permanent
handicap that essentially rises to the level of a guilt-phase defense, the
acknowledged limitations of "deliberateness" will be ignored. '
317. Id; see also supra note 34.
318. Id Indeed, the court noted that according to the psychologist's testimony, a
person suffering from personality avoidance disorder would not be impaired in his
ability to understand the wrongfulness of his actions. Id
319. Id
320. Id at 310 (emphasis added); see also Davis, 51 F.3d at 461 (comparing Davis's
failure to link his psychotic disorder to the crime to Madden's similar failure).
321. Penry, 492 U.S. at 322-23.
322. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
323. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that, as in Penry, the mitigating effect of evi-
dence of child abuse cannot be considered under the deliberateness special issue, es-
pecially when the term "deliberately" was not defined, and the state argued during
voir dire and closing argument that it meant the same thing as "intentionally." Motley
II, 18 F.3d at 1232 n.6 ("[E]vidence of child abuse does not 'logically' come into play
in considering the deliberateness question." (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915,
925 (5th Cir. 1987)), modled, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)). In Davis, the court considered a
definition of "deliberately" that it believed would have satisfied the Penry court: "a
manner of doing an act characterized by or resulting from careful consideration: a
conscious decision involving a thought process which embraces more than mere will
to engage in the conduct." 51 F.3d at 462-63. Under the analysis set forth in this
article, even this treatment of the deliberateness special issue question would be an
invalid restriction on the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence.
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Consideration of a defendant's mental disability fares no better
under the future-dangerousness special issue. For "constitutionally
relevant mitigating evidence" of a mental disability to be beyond the
"effective reach ' '31 of the jury as it considers the defendant's future
dangerousness, the Fifth Circuit requires that the disability be perma-
nent.3  Under the Fifth Circuit's construction, if testimony estab-
lishes a possibility that the mental disability is treatable, it may be
characterized as transient.326 If the mental disability is transient, its
mitigating qualities may be considered as an indicia of the lack of fu-
ture dangerousness because it may not cause the defendant to exhibit
the same violent conduct in the future.327 Thus, if the mental disabil-
ity is treatable, it must be considered in the context of a punishment
factor that is unrelated to the crime even when the defendant has
linked the evidence to his commission of the crime. This interpreta-
tion by the Fifth Circuit again denies the jury the opportunity to con-
sider the defendant's mental disability as it informs his
deathworthiness.
By restricting "constitutionally mitigating evidence" to that which
lessens a defendant's culpability in the guilt-phase sense and by re-
quiring a nexus between the evidence of mental disabilities and the
commission of the crime, the Fifth Circuit turns the punishment phase
into a process that too closely replicates the guilt phase. In response
to Penry, the Fifth Circuit's test was designed to identify the kind of
evidence that would require instruction to the jury beyond the two
special-issue questions covering deliberateness and future dangerous-
ness. Rather than allow the jury to reevaluate the defendant's com-
mission of the crime under a broader, reconceptualized notion of
culpability, or to consider mental disabilities as a punishment factor
unrelated to the crime, the nexus test denies the jury the ability to
consider punishment as a question separate from guilt.
324. Madden, 18 F.3d at 308.
325. Requiring the handicap to be permanent seems to duplicate the test for consti-
tutionally relevant mitigating evidence. The Fifth Circuit has addressed the question
whether mitigating evidence is beyond the reach of the jurors in only two cases, Mot-
ley and Graham. In both cases the Court assumed the condition might constitute
constitutionally mitigating evidence. Graham, 950 F.2d at 1030 (reasoning that the
crime may or may not be not attributable to youth); Motley II, 18 F.3d at 1235 n.10
(assuming without deciding that the condition was constitutionally mitigating).
326. Motley I, 18 F.3d at 1234-35. The court found that the long term effects of
Motley's child abuse were transient because "[a]lthough [the doctor who testified on
Motley's behalf at punishment] would not specifically comment on the probability of
Motley's being successfully treated, he stated that Motley had a possibility of success-
ful treatment." Id.
327. Because Motley's mental disability was subject to change, the jury could con-
sider this evidence within the context of future dangerousness. Johnson v. Texas sup-
ports this analysis. 509 U.S. 350, 369 (1993) (holding that, as a transient state, the
qualities of youth that reduce a defendant's culpability may be considered under fu-




This part reveals the difficulty in effectuating the difference be-
tween the determinations made at the guilt and punishment phases.
Rather than recognizing, explaining, and applying the different pur-
poses of the two determinations, courts too often treat the punishment
inquiry as a restatement of the guilty verdict. The California death
penalty statute approved in Boyde v. California' did this by making
the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence unrelated to the crime
dependent on its view of the gravity of the offense. The only way that
the jury could find the defendant deserved a life sentence rather than
death, based on this evidence, was to find the murder less serious.
The punishment phase was essentially reduced to a recapitulation of
the guilt decision.
The same phenomenon occurs when courts utilize guilt-phase tests
in the punishment phase. By suggesting that evidence offered in miti-
gation of punishment puts into question the defendant's criminal re-
sponsibility, or by requiring that the defendant's mental disability rise
to the level of insanity in order to be given mitigating weight, the pun-
ishment determination becomes a replay of the guilt-phase decision.
Requiring a nexus between the crime and mitigating evidence of
mental disabilities in order to constitute "constitutionally relevant
mitigating evidence" perpetuates the same mistake because it limits
the punishment-phase consideration of this evidence to the defend-
ant's guilt-phase culpability. In each instance, the courts ignore or
eviscerate the import of the two phases in a death penalty trial. In-
stead of working within a legal framework that recognizes the two
distinct decisions, these courts suggest that it is acceptable to treat the
two as one, i.e., the guilt-phase determination. The frequency and
persistence of this kind of flawed analysis makes it incumbent to ask
why this occurs, and how it can be addressed in a way that brings
coherence to the discrete determinations made at the guilt and pun-
ishment phases.
III. CONFRONTING THE ELUsIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GUILT
AND PUNISHMENT
The decision to sentence a defendant to death represents both a
legal and a moral judgment about the crime of murder and the de-
fendant convicted of committing the murder. As such, it serves dual
purposes. It must enforce a legally recognized punishment deemed
proportionate to the crime and appropriate for the defendant, and it
must express community moral outrage.32 9 Yet, it also reveals a ten-
328. 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
329. Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, Ste-
vens, JJ.) ("In part, capital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at
particularly offensive conduct. This function may be unappealing to many, but it is
1997]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
sion between wanting to avenge that sense of outrage 330 and society's
belief that not all individuals are equally deserving of a death sen-
tence.33' The tendency to collapse the distinction between the finding
of guilt and the decision about the appropriate punishment based on
that finding exemplifies the discord between these purposes. It
reveals the power of outrage and the necessity for a conscientious con-
struction of the differences between guilt and punishment. This part
analyzes how these factors elucidate the importance of distinguishing
between culpability as a guilt-phase concept and deathworthiness as a
punishment-phase concept.
A. The Role of Moral Outrage
The moral outrage prompted against a person who commits a mur-
der is undeniable. As Judge Noonan of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized in Harris v. Vasquez: "When
monstrous deeds are done, such as the killing[s] ... in this case, there
is a natural desire to avenge the outrage and to eliminate [the] perpe-
trator." '332 The willingness to treat the punishment decision as a reca-
pitulation of the guilt decision relies on the power of this outrage.
The conviction at the guilt phase represents a determination that
the defendant is legally culpable and blameworthy. The jury must find
that the legal requirements are satisfied-that the State proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed a person with the
requisite "degree of culpability"-but it has a significance beyond the
legal facts. The jury determination of guilt is a judgment that the de-
fendant is fully responsible for committing the highest degree of mur-
der recognized in the jurisdiction. In this context, it is not difficult for
a juror to believe that the conviction alone should resolve the punish-
ment question.
When prosecutors rely on the guilty verdict or use guilt-phase lan-
guage at the punishment phase, they invoke the power of the convic-
tion and the moral opprobrium it represents to provide the answer to
the punishment question.33 3 This occurs, for example, when a prose-
essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather
than self-help to vindicate their wrongs." (footnote omitted)); see also Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 469 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (declaring that the judgment that the defendant should be sentenced to death is
an "expression of the community's outrage-its sense that an individual has lost his
moral entitlement to live . ").
330. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
331. Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976) (opinion of Stew-
art, Powell, Stevens, JJ.). This tension may be compounded by the jurisprudential
focus on blameworthiness when the human inclination is to taint. See Fletcher, supra
note 25, at 343-49.
332. 943 F.2d 930, 967 (9th Cir. 1990) (Noonan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
333. Weisberg, supra note 2, at 361 (noting that prosecutors want to focus on the
"most damning facts about the crime").
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cutor argues at the punishment phase that the defendant's mitigating
evidence does not excuse his conduct,3" or when the prosecutor refers
back to a guilt-phase argument that mental disease or defect does not
affect a defendant's criminal responsibility.335 In these instances, the
prosecution is encouraging the jury to see the two decisions as one. In
essence, the prosecution is seeking to have the weight of the jury's
culpability finding at the guilt phase determine, or substitute for, the
jury's separate decision of what punishment is appropriate.
The moral outrage that jurors, as representatives of society, feel to-
ward the crime of murder and those who commit it, responds to this
prompting.336 But society is also called on to temper the human de-
sire for revenge337 and, as a matter of punishment, reconsider the
murder in a new way and consider new, non-guilt-phase factors.338 As
Judge Noonan recognized about the desire to "eliminate the perpetra-
tor," "[a]t the same time the suspicion, if not the certainty, must occur
to reasonable persons that the person who performed such awful
deeds is, if not insane, at least laboring under an infirmity of mind." 339
Despite the power of moral outrage, the jury must be guided by the
fundamental principles that the death penalty is not a mandatory pun-
ishment and the decision of what punishment to apply to a murderer
334. See, eg., Trottie v. State, No. 71,793, slip op. at 25 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 20,
1995) (unpublished) ("[I]s there something in his background that means he doesn't
deserve the death penalty, but he deserves a life sentence instead of the death pen-
alty? [Defense counsel] brought you that evidence. That was one of the saddest sto-
ries I ever heard. What happened to [the defendant] was a horrible thing. No child
should ever have to endure that. But that does not excuse what he did."); Whalen v.
State, 492 A.2d 552, 569 (Del 1985) (finding that the prosecutor erred by saying that
mitigating factors offered were "insufficient 'to mitigate and excuse.' Mitigating fac-
tors are not offered to excuse the defendant's conduct. . . ."); see also State v. Perry,
502 So. 2d 543, 561 (La. 1986) (noting, in rebuttal, that the prosecutor told the jury
that the law requires the death penalty for persons convicted of first degree murder,
but finding this was not a basis for reversal because the defendant did not object and
the instructions properly informed the jury of the need to weigh the evidence).
335. See supra note 218.
336. See Bowers, supra note 15, at 1089-92 (noting that almost one-third of jurors
surveyed in seven states thought, prior to the start of the punishment phase, that the
defendant should be sentenced to death and that between 21% and 33% thought the
death penalty was required if the state proved the crime was heinous); Sandys, supra
note 15, at 1191-95 (stating that 43% of jurors surveyed in Kentucky thought, prior to
the start of the punishment phase, that the defendant should be sentenced to death).
337. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powel, Ste-
vens, JJ.); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (emphasizing that the jury must
make a "reasoned moral response" to the defendant and his crime) (quoting Califor-
nia v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538,545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)); see also Samuel H.
Pillsbury, Emotional Justice. Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 655, 698-705 (1989) (arguing the importance of judges acknowledging and
instructing juries on the role of both moral outrage and empathy, especially at the
punishment phase of a death penalty case).
338. See supra notes 3-4, 28-61 and accompanying text.
339. Harris v. Vasquez, 943 F.2d 930, 967 (9th Cir. 1990) (Noonan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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is purposefully made in a phase separate from, and critically different
from, that in which his guilt is established.
B. Honoring the Difference Between the Decisions Made at the
Guilt and Punishment Phases
The challenge is how to conceptualize the jury's decision at the pun-
ishment phase in a way that does not lessen the gravity of the guilty
verdict yet acknowledges that death may or may not be the appropri-
ate sentence. 4° The analysis in this article demonstrates that the
equal importance of the two determinations may be maintained if
their differences are properly articulated. Characterizing the punish-
ment-phase inquiry as one about the defendant's deathworthiness,
rather than his culpability, should accomplish this goal. This concep-
tualization builds on the insight of Judge Reavley of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit who stated, "'[C]ulpability' at
the punishment phase is not simply a question of guilt or blameworthi-
ness, but rather a question of 'deathworthiness.'' 4 1
By focusing on the defendant's deathworthiness, instead of his cul-
pability, the punishment-phase decision is put in proper perspective.
The concept of culpability, whether considered as the guilt-phase find-
ing of mental state, or the judgment of blameworthiness, remains fo-
cused on the murder. Even in its broader, reconceptualized
dimension at punishment where the defendant's degree of participa-
tion in the crime, or the character of the murder, are relevant factors,
the focus is still on the crime. In contrast, the question of what pun-
ishment should be imposed on the defendant for committing a murder
340. When I began working on this article I assumed my conclusion would address
the question of whether a difference should be maintained. Ultimately, I concluded
the answer to this question is too plain to merit extended discussion. For too long,
our system of criminal justice has recognized the importance of individualized sen-
tencing. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (upholding the practice
of individualized punishment); Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55
(1937) ("For the determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration
of more than the particular acts by which the crime was committed and that there be
taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and
propensities of the offender."). While factors about the defendant and the crime are
considered as a matter of policy rather than constitutionally required in non-capital
cases, the same principle of individualized consideration applies. Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 602-04 (1978) (Burger, J., plurality). To abandon in a death penalty case a
kind of consideration ingrained in our system for less serious crimes, would be the
epitome of injustice.
341. Graham v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1009, 1034 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Reavley, J.,
dissenting) (citing Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en
banc), aff'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 461 (1993). Judge Reavley continued, "To say
that evidence mitigates a defendant's culpability is not to say that he is any less guilty
or deserving of blame, but that he is less deserving of death." Id. Professor Good-
paster frames the punishment phase question as being "about the convicted defend-
ant's worthiness to live." Goodpaster, supra note 70, at 303. These two formulations
are not necessarily inconsistent: Both focus on the worth of the individual defendant
in assessing his appropriate punishment.
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is more than a statement about his culpability for the crime; it is a
judgment about his character, his record, his background, the circum-
stances and character of the murder, and the harm caused, not only to
the victim, but to the victim's family. None of these features are rele-
vant to the guilt-phase determination of culpability, they are all essen-
tial to the punishment decision about the defendant's
deathworthiness.
The assessment of the defendant's deathworthiness, as distinct from
his culpability, is necessary if the decision made at the punishment
phase is to be truly different from the decision made at the guilt phase.
This distinction does not discount the verdict of guilty. Indeed the
jury would not be deciding between life imprisonment and death if the
defendant had not been convicted of the most serious crime. At the
punishment phase the defendant is not asking the jury to ignore the
crime for which it just convicted him. Rather, he is seeking to explain
himself or his conduct in a way that will cause the jury to impose a life
sentence rather than a death sentence.1 2 To fully realize the import
of the punishment decision, the jury must be able to consider the de-
fendant as fully responsible, culpable, and blameworthy, and in the
face of that, consider whether he is worthy of death.
Effectuating and honoring this distinction requires a transformation
in how the punishment phase is conceived and explained to the jury.
It requires a new and distinct language-one that is based on the de-
fendant's deathworthiness instead of his culpability. In this context,
the prosecution and defense must present evidence and craft argu-
ments about the appropriate punishment, not merely the crime? 3
342. See Alfieri, supra note 43, at 346-49 (arguing that the key to jury voting for a
life sentence is "to tell stories of moral agency highlighting defendants' acceptance of
blame and confession of responsibility for lawbreaking"); William S. Geimer, Law
and Reality in the Capital Penalty Trial, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L & Soc. Change 273, 286
(1990-91) (observing that it is critical to establish impairment traceable "directly and
understandably to the crime"); Sarat, supra note 43, at 41 (stating that the defense
must explain that the penalty phase "narrative does not undo, or diminish, the seri-
ousness of the murder itself"); Weisberg, supra note 2, at 361 ("The overall goal of the
defense is to present a human narrative, an explanation of the defendant's apparently
malignant violence as in some way rooted in understandable aspects of the human
condition, so the jury will be less inclined to cast him out of the human circle.").
343. This may be easier said than done. Many prosecutors rely on the crime itself
as the key to the punishment decision. See supra notes 218 & 234. Nonetheless, the
prosecution should be required to justify imposition of the death penalty based on
more than the facts of the murder presented at the guilt phase. See White, supra note
43, at 120-21 (arguing that the prosecution should be required to make a dispassionate
argument based on statutorily defined aggravating and mitigating circumstances). In
this context, the defense effort to explain who the defendant is and explain-rather
than excuse-his conduct could be better appreciated. See supra notes 43 & 342 and
accompanying text. For example, the defense could argue along the following lines:
There is no excuse for what William Brooks did. When you consider miti-
gating evidence it isn't to excuse or justify. He is responsible for what he
did. That's why we are here, why we are at this point. That's been decided
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Courts should differently instruct juries.A If the defendant presented
an insanity defense, for example, the court should instruct the jury
that it may consider the evidence of mental illness in a new way at the
punishment phase: that the jury may consider the mental illness as
mitigating even if it did not rise to the level of a defense to the murder
itself.345 In all cases the court should instruct the jury on the relation-
ship between the two determinations; that the punishment phase is
not a recapitulation of the guilt-phase decisions, but a new question
about the punishment appropriate for the defendant-whether he de-
serves to die or to be sentenced to life imprisonment. For example,
part of the instructions could include the following:
.... Mitigating evidence is offered to help you understand what he did and
why, not to excuse or justify it.
Sarat, supra note 43, at 41 (quoting from the defense argument at the punishment
phase).
344. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of guiding jurors as they
make their sentencing judgment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190-95 (1976); see
also Liebman & Shepard, supra note 35, at 786-89 (arguing that constitutional impera-
tive exists to instruct on mitigating factors). Nonetheless, a significant body of re-
search suggests that jurors do not understand the instructions given at the punishment
phase of a death penalty trial. See, ag., Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 23-53(arguing that statutory factors made little difference to jury decision); Haney &
Lynch, supra note 15, at 420-24 (finding that jurors did not understand statutory ag-
gravating and mitigating factors); Peter Meijes Tliersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do
Capital Jurors Understand Mitigation?, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 1 (summarizing studies and
anecdotal evidence regarding juror confusion); see generally Symposium: The Capital
Jury Project, 70 Ind. L.. 1033 (1995) (examining the exercise of capital sentencing
discretion). While these problems are not unique to jury instructions in death penalty
cases, in this context they have a special urgency. See Shari Seidman Diamond &
Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by Revising and Testing Jury Instruc-
tions, 79 Judicature 224, 224 (1996). Diamond and Levi's article reports the results of
their recent study of revised jury instructions and suggests that carefully worded in-
structions may promote jurors' comprehension of their responsibility at the punish-
ment phase. l at 230-31.
Although how the jury is instructed to consider the appropriate punishment is not
now constitutionally mandated, Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484,490 (1990), I submit that
it should be, in order to effectuate the promise of individualized sentencing in a bifur-
cated system. See Scott W. Howe, Reassessing the Individualization Mandate in Capi.
tal Sentencing: Darrow's Defense of Leopold and Loeb, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 989, 1048-51(1994) (arguing that restrictions on how the jury considers mitigating evidence effec-
tively eviscerate its ability to make an individualized sentencing decision).
345. Some statutory lists of mitigating factors specifically include language to this
effect. See supra note 229. When this is relevant the judge should be required to draw
the jury's attention to this, and explain its significance. See, e.g., Diamond & Levi,
supra note 344, at 227 (noting that in their study, to correct an "earlier source of
confusion," jurors were "told specifically: In order to decide that something is a miti-
gating factor which would lessen the penalty, you do NOT have to believe that it
excuses or justifies the crime itself"); Liebman & Shepard, supra note 35, at 818-19(arguing that when a defendant presents mitigating evidence of mental disorder, the
court should instruct the jury to consider whether: the defendant's suffering evokes
expiation or compassion, his impairment affected his responsibility for his actions, the




Your decision about the appropriate punishment for the defendant
is not a question of whether you consider him culpable or blame-
worthy. By finding the defendant guilty of murder you told the de-
fendant, and this court, that he is blameworthy and deserves to be
punished. You must now turn your attention to a related question.
You must now determine how the defendant should be punished:
by a sentence of life imprisonment or by a sentence of death.
Your judgment about how to punish the defendant will not change
the seriousness of the murder of which you convicted him. If you
conclude that the defendant should be sentenced to life imprison-
ment rather than death, it does not mean that you find him any less
guilty or deserving of blame, but that you find he is not deserving of
death. Likewise, if you conclude that he should be sentenced to
death, it does not mean that he is any more guilty, or that the mur-
der is any more serious. Both life imprisonment and death are au-
thorized sentences for the murder of which you convicted the
defendant. 4
Without this kind of explicit framework and jury instructions, the
Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence regarding the impor-
tance of individualized sentencing in a bifurcated proceeding is with-
out effect.
CONCLUSION
The decision to sentence to death or life imprisonment a defendant
convicted of committing murder is a profound judgment. The deci-
346. See also Jordan M. Steiker, The Limits of Legal Language: Decisionmaking in
Capital Cases, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2590, 2598-99 (1996) (proposing, among other meas-
ures to limit the reach of death penalty, that courts instruct jurors that conviction does
not create presumption that death penalty is the appropriate punishment and that in
deciding whether defendant deserves death "the sentencer is required to consider not
only the circumstances surrounding the crime, but also aspects of the defendant's
character, background, and capabilities that bear on his culpability for the crime");
Patrick E. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, 41 Case W. Res. L Rev. 1047,
1062 (1991) (suggesting that, where the defendant is an accomplice, the 'jury should
be told that its verdict of moral culpability may not rest on a level of culpability lower
than the bare intent to kill-the floor of culpability under the Eighth Amendment");
Howe, supra note 66, at 358 (suggesting the judge pose two questions to the jury, one
requiring assessment of the defendant's moral responsibility for the crime and the
second regarding his general moral deserts).
Some courts approve of instructing the jury that it may consider evidence as miti-
gating if it reduces the defendant's culpability or otherwise provides a basis for a
sentence less than death. See, e.g., State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1372 (Conn. 1994);
State v. Brett, 892 P.2d 29, 61 (Wash. 1995) (en banc). This is insufficient because it
does not adequately distinguish between culpability as a guilt-phase concept and
deathworthiness. See State v. Lawrence, 541 N.E.2d 451, 457 (Ohio 1989) (noting that
mitigating factors are related to punishment, not culpability for the crime). While the
disjunctive is important, it expects too much of the jury to consider a mitigating factor
specifically about the defendant's impaired mental capacity at the time of the murder
as it informs not his reduced culpability for the crime but a separate reason to vote for
a sentence less than death.
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sion requires the jury to first find that the defendant possessed the
degree of culpability required to commit the most serious of crimes.
As a separate yet intimately related matter, the decision requires the
jury to judge how the defendant should be punished. Contrary to the
explicit and implicit views of many courts, prosecutors, and jurors, as
reviewed in this Article, this determination is not a recapitulation of
the guilty verdict but a reconceptualization of the defendant's culpa-
bility for the crime and consideration of new factors unrelated to his
culpability. To decide whether the defendant is worthy of a death sen-
tence, the jury must consider not only the crime and the defendant's
responsibility for it, reconceived as relating to his deathworthiness
rather than his guilt-phase culpability, but also evidence about the de-
fendant's character, record, and background, both as it aggravates and
mitigates the punishment. By using terminology and jury instructions
to focus the jury on the distinction between its determinations at the
two phases, the punishment decision will more accurately reflect the
jury's judgment of the defendant's deathworthiness, rather than just
his culpability for the crime. Identifying these distinctions will help
insure that the jury's punishment decision is a "reasoned moral re-
sponse," 7 that the purpose of the bifurcated trial and the goals of
individualized sentencing are carried out, and that the decision to sen-
tence the defendant to life imprisonment or death is not merely a re-
statement of the decision finding him guilty of murder but an
appropriate reflection of his deserved punishment.
347. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479
U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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